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Abstract 
The study examines a sample of 224 reverse takeovers (RTOs) that took 
place in Europe between 1996 and 2015 along with a matched sample of 
IPOs that occurred over the same period. Particularly, our study 
investigates whether RTOs provoke wealth effects comparable to IPOs. 
Employing the classical event study methodology, we find that both 
RTOs and IPOs exhibit comparable short-term and long-term price 
performance. It is also shown that RTO firms display better operating 
performance than their control IPO counterparts in the post-going public 
period. Equivalent survival rates for both groups are reported, as well. By 
splitting the overall population into UK and non-UK sub-samples, it 
seems that our results are not UK-driven but rather it is a pan-European 
phenomenon. In sum, reverse takeovers should offer a viable alternative 
to IPOs for certain types of firms. 
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Abstract 
The study examines a sample of 224 reverse takeovers (RTOs) that took place in 
Europe between 1996 and 2015 along with a matched sample of IPOs that occurred 
over the same period. Particularly, our study investigates whether RTOs provoke 
wealth effects comparable to IPOs. Employing the classical event study methodology, 
we find that both RTOs and IPOs exhibit comparable short-term and long-term price 
performance. It is also shown that RTO firms display better operating performance 
than their control IPO counterparts in the post-going public period. Equivalent 
survival rates for both groups are reported, as well. By splitting the overall population 
into UK and non-UK sub-samples, it seems that our results are not UK-driven but 
rather it is a pan-European phenomenon. In sum, reverse takeovers should offer a 
viable alternative to IPOs for certain types of firms. 
Introduction 
Going public has always been regarded as one of the most important options that the 
owners of every private firm consider at some point of the business life. The 
conventional going-public mechanism is that of an initial public offering (IPO), which 
is the first time that the stock of a private company is offered to the investing public. 
The IPO, though, entails substantial compliance obligations undertaken by companies 
which aspire to be publicly traded in terms of eligibility requirements, transparency 
and disclosure prerequisites and minimum corporate governance standards. An 
alternative to the expensive and time-consuming IPO procedure can be found in a 
reverse takeover, where a private company merges with a public one and thus obtains 
its listing status. It is worth mentioning that in the rest of the study the terms “reverse 
takeovers (RTOs)”, “reverse mergers (RMs)” and “backdoor listings (BDLs)” are 
used interchangeably. The reverse lies in the fact that while technically the public 
company is the bidder, the initiator of the merger is the target (the private company), 
which ultimately takes control over the new enlarged entity. Indicatively, the New 
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York Stock Exchange went public through a reverse merger with the electronic-
trading company Archipelago Holdings Inc.1 This transaction signals to researchers 
that reverse takeovers deserve their attention. 
Since 1980 reverse mergers have gained increased popularity in the US over-the-
counter (OTC) markets, in which public shell companies have been used as vehicles 
for RM deals.2 Despite the larger publicity of US RTOs, back-door listings are a 
global phenomenon. For instance, in Australia reverse merger activity is highly 
intense in the mining industry.3 In Hong Kong, RMs are quite popular in the real 
estate development sector. 4 In the UK, reverse takeovers, especially in the form of 
synergistic mergers, provide a considerable alternative to IPOs (Appadu et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in Sweden after the dot-com bubble many public IT-companies have been 
used as vehicles for RTO transactions.5   
Recent fraudulent activities associated with reverse mergers 6  triggered pertinent 
regulatory responses around the world.7 Thereby, the traditional time and cost benefits 
linked with reverse mergers have been disputed. Faelten et al. (2013) argue that in the 
context of a regulated market reverse takeovers are employed by private companies 
that a) aim at the synergy gains which arise from the combination with a regularly 
operating listed company, b) seek for a listing status in times when IPO markets are 
harsh. 
Matching a sample of 224 reverse takeovers that occurred in Europe between 1996 
and 2015 with a control sample of IPOs that took place over the same period, our 
study attempts to answer whether European RTOs constitute a viable alternative to 
IPOs. Particularly, using the classical event study methodology, we compare the 
                                                          
1 Lucchetti, A., Craig, S., and D. Berman, “NYSE to Acquire Electronic Trader and Go Public”, The Wall 
Street Journal, 21 April 2005.  
2 See e.g. Floros and Sastri (2010)   
3 Brown et al. (2010) 
4 Fung, E. “Chinese Developers Take the Backdoor to Hong Kong Listings”, The Wall Street Journal 
(Moneybeat), 1 July 2013.  
5 Svensson et al. (2008)   
6 Concerning Chinese companies entering the US markets via RMs, see Jindra, et al. (2014). For a UK 
case, see Josephine Moulds, “Bumi reveals $200m black hole in financial results”, The Guardian, 31 
May 2013.  
7 For US, UK and Swedish regulation see section “Comparative Regulation”. For other jurisdictions, see 
Vermeulen (2014). 
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short-term and long-term market reaction to RTOs with that of their matched IPOs. 
Furthermore, computing various financial ratios, we evaluate the differences between 
the operating performance of RTOs and the operating performance of their IPO 
counterparts. Finally, we report the survival rates of the two groups. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the efficiency of 
RTO transactions in comparison with a control sample of IPOs using pan-European 
data. We also split the overall population into UK and non-UK sub-samples to see 
whether our results are valid throughout Europe. Our research comes to the light when 
laxer listing rules and regulations have been adopted by policy makers in order to 
rejuvenate IPO markets. For instance in the US, the “emerging growth company” 
(EGC) status under the JOBS Act facilitates high growth companies to conduct IPOs.8 
Similarly in Europe, NYSE Euronext has presented ENTERNEXT, the new pan-
European Exchange with more flexible listing rules, which is orientated towards small 
and medium-sized enterprises.9 Thus, we hope that our empirical findings will be 
useful to regulators in the difficult task of achieving a balance between credibility of 
capital markets and access to external capital. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the process of going-
public in general and the reverse merger mechanism in particular. Section 2 provides 
an analysis of the US, UK and Swedish regulatory frameworks and highlights the 
three distinctive approaches to the regulation of backdoor listings. Section 3 analyses 
the advantages and disadvantages of RTOs over IPOs and cites a reverse merger case. 
Section 4 presents a review of the relevant literature. Section 5 presents the data and 
the methodology employed in this study. Section 6 reports the empirical findings and 
Section 7 summarizes the inferences of the study.    
                                                          
8 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act encourages the financing of small and medium-sized 
enterprises by loosening many of the US securities regulations. It was signed into law on April 5, 2012. 
Available at:   https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobs-act.shtml  
9 ENTERNEXT was launched in May 2013. Available at: https://www.enternext.biz/en   
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SECTION 1 
The going public decision: pros and cons 
The introduction to the stock markets has traditionally been regarded as an inevitable 
step in the development of a company. However, a few well-known companies have 
remained private. Consider the cases of Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch), PwC or 
Deloitte. These facts denote that going public is not a step that all companies 
ultimately reach; it is rather an option (Pagano et. al., 1998).  
On the one hand, there are certain advantages exploited by a listed company. First, 
access to external funds is easier since public firms are more appealing to investors 
than private firms. This is because public companies: a) must release their financial 
statements promoting investors’ confidence towards their management10 , b) create 
liquidity through the trading of their stocks offering an exit strategy to interested 
investors, c) face less pressure than private companies regarding investors’ demand to 
control the management of the company, d) enjoy higher valuation in their shares. 
Empirical studies seem to suggest that the higher the publicity of a company, the 
higher its stock price. 11  This alternative method of raising capital renders listed 
companies less dependent on bank financing allowing them to reduce the amount of 
outstanding debt. Moreover, public information about a company’s financial 
condition prompts competition between its incumbent lenders and other aspiring 
lending institutions, leading to a lower cost of capital and/or an increase in the supply 
of external finance (Rajan, 1992). Second, liquidity provides an exit strategy not only 
for new investors, but also for company founders, executives and initial investors.12 
The latter are thus enabled to cash out without conceding control. Third, the company 
can use its trading stock as consideration for future acquisitions keeping, therefore, 
cash reserves for other activities. Fourth, potential conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management can be mitigated by granting stock options to 
executives. Furthermore, the possibility of a hostile takeover and subsequent 
                                                          
10 Restating, accountability of managers increases. 
11 See Merton (1987) and Kadlec and McConnell (1994) for the impact of investor recognition to stock 
valuations.  
12 Shareholders of private companies seek to diversify their portfolios by investing in several 
companies. 
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replacement of current managers impose extra discipline to them (Shleifer et al., 
1986). 
On the other hand, being public implies specific disadvantages for a company. First, 
the continuous pressure to reach market expectations each quarter shifts companies’ 
priorities from implementing long-term strategies to generating short-term profits 
(e.g. by reducing R&D expenses). In this sense, listed companies have stronger 
motives than unlisted companies to get involved in fraudulent activities, such as 
earnings management. Second, disclosure requirements coerce companies into 
revealing important information about their comparative advantages (Campbell, 
1979). Third, the public status entails significant costs for a company (compliance 
costs, audit fees etc.). 13 Last, public companies are susceptible to lawsuits, even if the 
claims are worthless. 
The reverse takeover (merger) process 
According to the SEC (Investor Bulletin, 2011), “in a reverse merger transaction, an 
existing public shell company, which is a public reporting company with few or no 
operations, acquires a private operating company - usually one that is seeking access 
to funding in the U.S. capital markets.” In a similar manner, pursuant to Listing Rule 
5.6 of the FCA 14 , a reverse takeover occurs when a listed company acquires a 
“business, company or assets…which in substance results in a fundamental change in 
the business or in a change in board or voting control of the issuer.” Therefore, the 
public counterparty in the transaction can be either a going-concern company or a 
non-operating company, as a result of bankruptcy, business failure or simply a clean 
shell seeking to merge with another firm.  
In a typical merger the bidding firm acquires the target firm and the bidder’s existing 
shareholders obtain the majority of the combined entity’s shareholdings. In a reverse 
merger the inverse happens: the target firm’s stockholders become the majority 
                                                          
13 In the context of a reverse merger with synergistic effects, the transaction might serve a dual role: 
On the one hand, the private company goes public. On the other hand, the new combined public 
entity is larger, implying that it is in a better financial condition to meet the costs of being public.  
14 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee and Prudential 
Regulation Authority are the three financial regulatory bodies in the UK.  
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shareholders of the merged public company.15 Particularly, in exchange for cash from 
the private company, the public company issues an adequate number of shares to the 
shareholders of the private company so that the latter gain a controlling interest in the 
new merged entity (Dasilas et. al., 2009). The private company’s shareholders usually 
receive 65%-95% of the enlarged company (Feldman, 2005). Restating, the public 
shell is the legal acquirer and accounting acquire, whereas the private company is the 
legal acquire and accounting acquirer (Pollard, 2016). The “reverse” lies in the fact 
that the initiator of the merger is the private target, which ultimately takes control 
over the public combined entity. Subsequently, the operating assets of the former 
private company become the principal assets of the public merged company. Thus, the 
managers of the former private company are usually assigned the daily control of the 
merged entity. The name of the new company is that of the private company or an 
entirely new name. 
A reverse merger can be structured as: a) a direct merger, where a public company 
merges directly into a private company, b) a reverse triangular merger, where a 
private company becomes a subsidiary of a public company and thus also being 
public16, c) a simple asset acquisition, where a public company acquires a proportion 
of the assets of a private company, giving in exchange the majority of the shares of 
the public company (Arellano-Ostoa et al., 2002). 
Finally, reverse takeovers have two distinctive aspects. From the public company’s 
stance, RMs signify a fundamental corporate restructuring in terms of ownership 
structure, business, board structure and management. From the private company’s 
point of view, RM is an alternative means of going public. 
                                                          
15 RM should not be confused with sell-outs. In a sell-out, a private company is acquired by a public 
company, resulting in the shareholders of the public company having a controlling ownership of the 
combined firm.  
16 The procedure is the following: The public company creates a wholly-owned subsidiary, which then 
merges into the private company. The private company shareholders swap their stock of the private 
company for stock of the public company, rendering them the majority shareholders of the public 
company. Effectively, the private company is a wholly owned subsidiary of the public company.  
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SECTION 2 
Comparative Regulation 
US Regulatory Framework 
The story of reverse takeovers in the United States dates back in 1970-80 when 
various market participants were forming new unregulated entities, the so called 
“blank check” companies, with the stated purpose of merging with a going-concern 
business after raising funds via IPOs. However, deceitful practices arose along with 
successful corporate combinations. Particularly, a few founders of these companies 
kept the IPO proceeds for themselves instead of seeking merger candidates.17In 1990, 
the Congress passed the Penny Stock Reform Act which granted the SEC the legal 
permission to intervene in the shell marketplace. In 1992, the SEC passed Rule 149 
according to which: 1) 90% of the funds raised in the IPO must be held in escrow and 
no trading of shares is allowed until the consummation of a merger, 2) there is a 
deadline of eighteen months after the public offering during which the shell must 
undertake a deal, otherwise investors receive all proceeds back, 3) investors in the 
shell can oppose a suggested deal and get their portion back. Effectively, investors’ 
approval is necessary in order for the merger to be completed.  
Blank check companies that have at least $5 million in assets prior to their IPO or 
raise $5 million at the minimum in their public offering avoid the implementation of 
Rule 419 and the aforementioned regulatory constraints. This legal gap enabled the 
emergence of specified (or special) purpose acquisition vehicles (SPACs). 18 
Furthermore, public shells that derived from the liquidation of formerly operating 
companies became popular, as Rule 419 did not stipulate such shells. Moreover, 
another mechanism became feasible: creating a blank check without conducting an 
IPO just for the sake of obtaining a listing status. The so called “virgin shell” would 
                                                          
17 For a thorough review of shell companies’ fraudulent activities, see Feldman (2006). “Reverse 
Mergers: Taking a company public without an IPO”, pp. 77-89. 
18 SPACs voluntarily adopt Rule 419 provisions (funds held in trust account, opt-out clauses, eighteen 
months deadline for the completion of a merger) in an attempt to entice investors. However, their 
shares are traded even before the acquisition (Sjostrom, 2007).   
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then seek for a reverse merger19. The SEC considers legitimate this type of shell since 
no public offering is entailed (Feldman, 2005).    
In 2005, the SEC adopted a rule amendment requiring the disclosure of all 
information related to the reverse merger within four days after the consummation of 
the deal, just like in an IPO prospectus. Previous rules, in contrast, allowed the 
combined entity to prolong the disclosure of such information for up to seventy-one 
days from the completion of the merger. Although this rule change aimed at 
eliminating “pump and dump” schemes 20 , it may disdain the time advantages 
associated with reverse mergers (Sjostrom, 2007). During the same year, the 
definition (and implicitly the recognition) of a shell company was provided by the 
SEC as a company with a) “no or nominal operations and b) either: (i) no or nominal 
assets, (ii) assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or (iii) assets 
consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets”. 
In the presence of growing allegations of accounting irregularities attributed to 
foreign reverse mergers and mainly Chinese companies entering the US capital 
markets through back-door listings, the SEC released an investor bulletin emphasizing 
the risks linked with investing in RM companies (June 9, 2011).21 Consequently, in 
November 2011, the SEC adopted stricter listing prerequisites for companies seeking 
to go public through reverse mergers: a) a one-year seasoning period is required 
during which the company must trade in a market other than the major US exchanges, 
b) the company’s shares must trade for a “sustained period” at the minimum initial 
listing price required by the major exchanges. 22 
Summarizing, public shells can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of 
public companies created for the sole purpose of merging with private companies: a) a 
“blank check” company under Rule 419, b) a SPAC as an exemption to Rule 41923, c) 
                                                          
19 These shells operate under a Form 10-SB filing pursuant to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rather 
than Rule 419. 
20 During the seventeen-one-day period, companies were publishing only positive features of their 
operations leading to increases (pumps) in stock prices. Initial investors were then selling their shares 
to uninformed buyers. 
21  “SEC Investor Bulletin: Reverse Mergers”, June 9, 2011. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/reversemergers.pdf  
22 “SEC approves new rules to toughen listing standards for reverse merger companies”, Press release, 
9 November 2011, Available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-235.htm  
23 It is noteworthy that not all SPAC transactions take the form of reverse mergers (Sjostrom, 2008).  
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a “virgin” shell by filing Form 10-SB. The second group comprises shells that stem 
from previously going concern companies: a) a “development stage” shell emerges 
from a business plan that fails to be realized, b) a “natural” shell is the consequence of 
a liquidation process following bankruptcy (Feldman, 2006). Other authors, e.g. Kolb 
et al. (2014) adopt a more general distinction between natural shells and cash shells. 
Natural shells are the outcomes of a former operating company’s bankruptcy or 
business failure. Cash shells (including SPACs) are public companies incorporated for 
the sole purpose of acquiring a going-concern company.  
UK Regulatory Framework     
Reverse takeovers in the UK have also suffered from bad reputation due to fraudulent 
activities of the involved companies.24 As a response in October 201225, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), -now Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – adopted new 
rules aiming at enhancing disclosure quality and corporate governance standards. 
First, a clear definition of a reverse takeover was provided focusing on two 
characteristics: if there is a “fundamental” change in the business or a change in the 
control of the board (and not in its composition) of the listed company as a result of 
the merger. Second, under the new regime a takeover between two already listed 
companies will be treated as a reverse takeover if they belong to different listing 
categories (e.g. if one company has a premium listing and the other has a standard 
listing). The rationale of this amendment is relevant to a certain shady tactic followed 
by SPACs: these companies, which initially obtained a standard listing, intended to 
acquire a listed operating company of senior listing status in order to become 
premium listed, although they were ineligible. Furthermore, as a general rule the FCA 
will cancel the listing of a company’s shares after the shareholders (of the listed 
company) approve the consummation of a reverse merger. Essentially, the combined 
entity must apply for admission as a new applicant following the usual procedure of 
an IPO company, such as the release of a prospectus and audited financial statements. 
                                                          
24 For two indicative examples, see: David Oakley,” City Watchdog to tighten listing rules”, The 
Financial Times, 2 October 2012.  
25 a) Financial Services Authority, “Amendments to the Listing Rules, Prospectus Rules, Disclosure 
Rules and Transparency Rules” (CP12/2), January 2012. b) Financial Services Authority, “Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of the Listing Regime and Feedback on CP12/2” (CP12/25), October 2012.    
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Exemptions from the cancellation rule can be recognized by the FCA.26 Finally, the 
FCA can suspend the trading of a company’s shares (before the consummation of a 
merger since after that a cancellation can be imposed) when investors do not access 
adequate information regarding the deal. The public company is obliged to timely 
inform the FCA about prospective reverse takeovers.27 
Swedish Regulatory Framework 
Since the second largest group of reverse takeovers in our sample took place in the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, a brief overview of the relevant regulation is presented. 
Generally, under Rule 3.3.12 a public company has the obligation to disclose 
information concerning major changes in its business, in the cases that the company 
may be deemed as an utterly new entity. As a reverse takeover is the acquisition of 
another business and affects drastically the ownership structure of the listed company, 
the aforementioned disclosure requirements are applied. In addition, the Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority (known as Finansinspektionen) can give an 
“observation status” to a company which released inadequate information (Rule 
2.7).28 This status acts as a warning bell for investors who wish to invest in companies 
associated with reverse takeovers. In any case, the Finansinspektionen can proceed 
with the cancellation or suspension of the trading in a company’s securities.    
Summary  
It is evident from the previous analysis that the track records of reverse takeovers in 
each country have provoked different regulatory reactions, which can be segregated in 
three distinctive approaches. First, the SEC has embraced a specific regulatory regime 
with seasoning period and minimum share price requirements. Second, the FCA 
evaluates reverse takeovers on an individual basis and requires IPO-style procedures 
at the admission stage. In fact, UK reverse mergers include not only traditional shell 
                                                          
26  See LR 5.6.23 G to LR 5.6.29 G of LR 5.6 concerning Reverse Takeovers. Available at:  
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LR/5/6.html 
 
27See LR 5.6.10 G to LR 5.6.18 R of LR 5.6 concerning Reverse Takeovers for exemptions from 
suspension provision. 
28  For Rules 3.3.12 and 2.7, see “Nasdaq Stockholm Rulebook for Issuers”. Available at:  
http://business.nasdaq.com/media/Nasdaq%20Stockholm%27s%20Rule%20book%20for%20Issuers%
20-%208%20December%202016_tcm5044-23124.pdf 
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companies, but also a significant number of operating companies seeking for 
synergistic mergers (Appadu et. al., 2014). Third, the Finansinspektionen adopts a 
more flexible stance (the “observation status”) focusing on warning the investors.29 
SECTION 3 
Reverse Mergers versus IPOs 
Advantages of RMs over IPOs 
Traditionally, reverse mergers had been considered as a back-door entry to the stock 
markets in terms of avoiding the extensive listing requirements and lengthy 
preparations associated with IPOs. Particularly, the total direct costs including all 
underwriting, legal and auditing costs for an IPO have been estimated at 
approximately 11% of the total offer (Ritter, 1998). On the other hand, the joint fees 
of the target and the acquirer in an RM account for 3% of the transaction value 
(Gleason et al., 2005).30 However, this cost does not contain the value of the stock 
ownership held by shell promoters in the new combined entity (Hurduzeu et al., 
2012). In addition, there is the argument that the cost of an RM combined with a 
seasoned equity offering equals to the 7% typical spread of an IPO (Chen et al., 2000 
and Arellano-Ostoa et al., 2002). 
The second often mentioned advantage of reverse mergers relates to time. An IPO 
takes between six months and a year and a half to be completed while an RM takes 
between one and six months to be consummated (Gleason et al., 2006).31 The time 
factor can also be perceived by the fact that the senior managers of a private company 
pursuing an IPO have to devote significant amount of time to support the financial 
advisors (e.g. during road shows, due diligence meetings). Therefore, managers have 
less time available to handle the daily operations of the company leading to extra 
costs (Song et al., 2014). However, the time saving benefit of RMs is debatable. First, 
comparing the maximum duration of an RM process with the minimum duration of an 
IPO process (six months), the speed advantage is doubtful. Second, upon completion 
                                                          
29 This flexibility might be explained by the relatively small number of reverse takeovers in Sweden. 
30 While an IPO typically costs several million dollars, gaining controlling interest in a trading shell 
costs $700,000 - $800,000 (Floros et. al., 2009). 
31 Brenner et al. (2004) report that the RM process lasts between two and nine months. 
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of an RM, the public merged company must comply with the relevant Authority’s 
listing requirements, for which the preparation requires substantial time (Jindra et al., 
2014). Third, it is not clear when the two processes start rendering possible 
comparisons concerning the duration of the transactions inaccurate (Brown et al., 
2010). For instance, an IPO could start much earlier than the kick-off meeting; an RM 
could begin much earlier than the announcement date (e.g. from the time the 
negotiations start).    
The aforementioned cost and time saving advantages of RMs had arisen from the lax 
regulatory frameworks applied to these transactions. However, several cases of frauds 
and abuses around RMs have led to accelerated regulatory scrutiny over the years.32 
Thus, potential benefits should also be found in other aspects of this going-public 
mechanism. 
First, since in a reverse merger the new combined entity does not necessarily raise 
new capital at the time of the listing, there is typically not much post-merger trading 
activity and thus the current market sentiment is less important. Consequently, there is 
no risk of underwriter’s withdrawal as in an IPO. In this sense, reverse mergers exist 
in all markets: when IPO markets flounder, RMs offer an alternative means of going 
public; when IPO markets flourish, RMs remain an option due to their other benefits 
(Feldman, 2006).33 Second, RMs enable another funding option, a private investment 
in public equity financing (PIPE). In a PIPE financing, a small group of sophisticated 
investors purchase stock of the public merged company at a discount to the current 
market price. Upon consummation of the reverse merger, a resale registration 
statement is filed and thus PIPE investors can sell their shares to the public.34 Third, 
as an RM is not inevitably completed in conjunction with an equity offering, founders 
and initial investors of the former private company experience less share dilution than 
in an IPO. Besides, the public shell’s shareholders gain a minority stake in the 
                                                          
32 See the section “Comparative Regulation” 
33 Indeed, Gleason et al. (2005) find that” …a little more than 40% or 49 of the transactions in our 
sample occur during the hot IPO wave of the mid to late 1990s.” Similarly, Faelten et al. (2013) find 
that “when the number of IPOs dropped by 96% during 2007-2009, the decline of RTOs was relatively 
modest”.  
34 PIPE financing offers a valuable funding solution to small public companies, as PIPE investors are 
attracted by appealing contract terms (e.g. warrants, cash flow rights). For a comprehensive analysis 
of PIPE financing, see: S. Chaplinsky and David Haushalter, “Financing under Extreme Risk: Contract 
Terms and Returns to Private Investments in Public Equity”. 
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enlarged company. The share dilution is also reduced in the case of a PIPE financing, 
since the amount of raised money is typically smaller than in an IPO.35 Fourth, since 
the public merged company can proceed with an equity public offering at a later stage 
back-door listing represent the two-stage strategy of listing by introduction in the UK 
(Brown et al., 2010). Through this process, a private company can gain an exchange 
listing status as an in IPO but without the simultaneous equity offering. Derrien et al. 
(2007) argue that the trading occurred in the aftermarket assists in mitigating the 
valuation uncertainties of these firms leading to lower degree of underpricing when 
shares are offered at a later stage. At this point in time, higher company valuations 
result to less ownership dilution for the founders and initial investors of the former 
private company. Fifth, tax losses of a public shell can be carried forward and thus the 
combined entity can offset partially the taxation of future capital gains (S. Ojha et al., 
2013).36 Sixth, IPO underwriters tend to modify the profile of the company in an 
attempt to render the company look more profitable in the short term (that is in the 
time that the equity offering takes place), at the expense of long-term strategy 
(Feldman, 2006). Last but not least, reverse mergers with public operating companies 
in similar types of business provide synergy prospects either in the form of cost 
reductions or revenue enhancements.   
Disadvantages of RMs over IPOs 
The crucial difference between RMs and IPOs is that in the former no underwriters 
are involved. According to Ellis et al. (2000), the underwriters in an IPO undertake 
the development of a liquid secondary market in the company’s stock by employing 
price stabilization techniques37 and promoting the business to investors. In an RM, by 
contrast, the public merged company should exhibit positive operating performance 
for several quarters until it triggers the interest of the investing public. Then, an equity 
offering and an active trading market in the company’s stock is feasible. However, 
during this restructuring period the funding sources of the company are usually 
limited, either because no capital has been raised as part of the RM transaction or 
                                                          
35 Floros et al. (2009) estimate that the median value of proceeds raised through PIPE financings 
reaches $3.2m.  
36 This benefit can be applied only in the case of an RM with a shell that emerged from a previous 
operating company. 
37 For a thorough review of the price stabilization activities, see:  Aggarwal (2000), “Stabilization 
activities by underwriters after initial public offerings.” 
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because potential financing alternatives (e.g. PIPE) offer inadequate funds. In this 
context, Carter et al. (1990) claim that going public via an IPO indicates a company of 
higher quality and lower risk; inversely, the absence of underwriters in an RM serves 
as a signal of lower quality/higher risk company. Therefore, the shares may trade at a 
discount to the market to depict the low quality and the relative illiquidity (Sjostrom, 
2007). Furthermore, Dasilas et al. (2009) contend that the private company runs the 
risk of inheriting the liabilities and negative reputation of the public company; it will 
be thus a challenge for the new management to establish a sound image for the 
enlarged entity. 
For the sake of accuracy, it is noteworthy that the aforementioned disadvantages 
apply in the case of natural shells.38 On the other hand, SPACs, which belong to the 
category of cash shells, have their own distinctive characteristics. First, in an RM with 
a SPAC the public merged company obtains the proceeds from the SPAC’s IPO 
(Cumming et al., 2014). Moreover, an active secondary market in the SPAC’s shares 
already exists and underwriters who participated in the SPAC’s IPO will likely have a 
vested interest in supporting the trading of the combined entity’s stock post-merger 
(Sjostrom, 2007). Furthermore, SPACs are “clean” shells without existing operations 
and hidden liabilities. Finally, we conjecture that synergistic mergers with going-
concern public companies strengthen the financial position of the enlarged entities in 
terms of increased capital resources during the reorganization period. In addition, an 
established trading market exists for the public company’s stock pre-merger.  
A Reverse Takeover Case 
On 28 April 2014, Terrace Hill, a listed company which shares were trading on the 
AIM market of the LSE since 1995, announced that it had conditionally agreed to 
merge with Urban & Civic, an unlisted company. Terrace Hill business included 
property development for commercial purposes, focusing on food stores, Central 
London offices and leisure sites. Urban & Civic provided residential development 
solutions in growth areas of the UK. The combination of two established real estate 
                                                          
38 For the concept of natural shells, see section “Comparative Regulation”. 
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companies would create significant synergies, leading to a new “Best in Class” UK 
real estate company.39  
Pursuant to Listing Rule 5.6 concerning reverse takeovers, the trading of Terrace Hill 
ordinary shares on AIM was suspended (on 28 April) until the release of a prospectus 
relating to the acquisition details. Later at the same date, the prospectus was 
published. Under the terms of the deal, Terrace Hill would issue 43.1 million shares to 
the shareholders of Urban & Civic. As the existing ordinary shares of Terrace Hill at 
the time of the issue were 21.2 million, it is apparent that the shareholders of Urban & 
Civic would hold more shares in the enlarged group than the existing Terrace Hill 
shareholders. In addition, a change in board control of the combined entity took place: 
Nigel Hugill, former Executive Chairman of Urban&Civic, was appointed as 
Executive Chairman; Robin Butler, former Managing Director of Urban&Civic, was 
appointed as Managing Director. The name of the new public company was also 
changed to “Urban & Civic plc”. Unsurprisingly, the transaction was treated as a 
reverse takeover. It is noteworthy that a concurrent placing of 75.6 million new shares 
occurred resulting to £170 million new funds for the enlarged group. According to the 
timetable, on 22 May 2014, trading on AIM was cancelled and the new enlarged 
company was admitted to the standard listing segment of the Official List and to 
trading (only) to the Main Market of LSE. It is noteworthy that as at 29 April 2014, 
the first trading day after the announcement of the merger, the stock price of former 
Terrace Hill increased by 14%, implying that the market viewed positively the 
synergies associated with the proposed deal. 
Summarizing, it is evident from the previous example from Europe, in contrast to the 
US, strictly defined shell companies are not necessarily the prevailing type of listed 
firms participating in reverse mergers. Furthermore, the transaction is usually 
structured as a stock-swap merger with simultaneous raise of capital, in line with the 
findings of Appadu et al. (2014). The fact that the acquisition was consummated on 
22 May 2014, 24 days after the announcement of the transaction, justifies partially the 
                                                          
39 “Urban & Civic To Reverse Into Terrace Hill And Raise GBP170 Million”, 28 April 2014. Available at: 
http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/AN_1398680225845129500/urbancivic-to-reverse-into-
terrace-hill-and-raise-gbp170-million.aspx 
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time-saving argument associated with reverse takeovers. Moreover, the suspension 
requirement assists in reducing existing information asymmetries, while the 
cancellation and readmission requirement implies that reverse takeovers and IPOs are 
homogeneously treated. Therefore, the superiority or not of IPOs versus RTOs 
remains an open empirical question. 
SECTION 4 
Relevant Literature 
While literature on RMs has substantially increased over the years, the vast majority 
of studies focuses on the U.S capital markets. The most popular topics relate to the 
characteristics, motivations, aftermarket performance, earnings quality and applicable 
regulation of RMs. 
US Evidence 
Gleason et al. (2005) were the first to examine the characteristics, incentives and wealth 
effects of reverse takeovers, using a relatively small sample of 121 reverse takeovers occurred 
in the US over the period 1987-2001. According to the proxy statements in which the RMs 
are described, managers of public firms participate in RMs mostly due to the sound financial 
condition of the private counterparty. On the other hand, managers of private companies 
choose the RM alternative mainly aiming at growth or moving into related types of business. 
In fact, 27% of the public and private firms included in the sample operate in the same 
industry, while 31% and 41% belong to related or different industry sectors respectively. 
Although the public companies engaged in reverse takeovers exhibit on average poor pre-
merger performance, their shareholders gain significantly positive returns upon deal 
announcement. These wealth gains remain significant even when the sample of public firms is 
split into distressed and healthy. The authors show that a) the shareholders of distressed firms 
realize positive returns implying that the RMs allow them to partially recover their 
investment; b) financially healthy firms exhibit higher returns suggesting that corporate 
combinations might provoke synergistic effects.40  Furthermore, the post-merger operating 
performance of the new entities is feeble and less than half of the sample survives 2 years 
after the RM. The authors conclude that RMs represent risky alternatives to IPOs as they fail 
to generate long-term wealth for the shareholders of the public-merged company.  
                                                          
40 Besides, the sample comprises strictly defined shell companies as well as operating companies. 
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Gleason et al. (2006) examine reverse takeovers and self-underwritten IPOs in comparison 
with a matched sample of traditional IPOs for the period 1986-2003. Despite the frequently 
referred belief that smaller firms with greater risks prefer alternatives to the conventional 
underwritten IPO, the RTO sample is not statistically different from the matched IPO sample 
in terms of total assets and financial distress in the year prior to going public. Two years after 
going public, reverse takeovers and self-underwritten (“SUs”) firms have lower profitability 
(in terms of ROA) and balance sheet liquidity, yet their ROE and financial leverage are not 
statistically different from the control IPO firms. Regarding stock market performance, RTOs 
and SUs outperform the control IPO firms in the short-term and experience equivalent 
performance three years after going public. It can thus be inferred that reverse mergers should 
constitute a viable alternative to IPOs for certain types of firms. 
Using a small sample of 23 reverse mergers that occurred over the period 1999-2001, 
Aydogdu et al. (2007) report increased trading activity and sporadic but statistically 
significant positive returns surrounding merger announcement, suggesting that the market is 
receptive to such transactions. 
Adjei et al. (2008) examine 286 RMs that took place between 1990-2002 in comparison with 
a control sample of IPOs in terms of industry, listing exchange and time. The authors find that 
only 1.4 % of the RM sample is unable to meet at least one of the initial listing standards, 
implying that the majority of these companies have the privilege of choosing between an IPO 
and an RM. However, three years after going public 42.7% of RMs were delisted in contrast 
to 27% of their matched IPOs. To the authors’ view, the lower survival rates for RMs may be 
attributed to the absence of underwriters’ support in the aftermarket. In addition, these 
findings accord with the notion that small, young and inferior firms prefer the RM route due 
to the lower costs incurred (Arellano Ostoa et al., 2002). 
Floros and Sastri (2009) compare RMs41 with penny stock IPOs (PSIPOs) that took place 
between 1979 and 2006. Private firms involved in RMs tend to be younger, smaller, more at a 
growth phase, less profitable and liquid than their matched PSIPOs. The authors contend that 
the RM mechanism enables companies with substantial information asymmetries to obtain a 
listing status and seek financing via private placements (e.g. PIPEs). Since existing valuation 
uncertainties discourage potential outside investors, it is easier for RM firms to convince a 
small group of sophisticated investors.42 This argument is consistent with the notion that the 
                                                          
41 The sample comprises RMs with both shell and regularly operating public companies. 
42 In fact, 47.06% of the entire RM sample is associated with PIPE transactions.  
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level of information asymmetries plays a pivotal role in the choice between issuing public or 
private equity (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). 
Floros and Sapp (2011) explore 585 US reverse takeovers with trading shell companies43 for 
the period 2006-200844; shell companies have no assets or operations and their stock prices 
decrease over time. Given a three-month cumulative abnormal return of 48.1% surrounding 
the completion of the RM, the authors support that investing in a shell firm with high 
probability of conducting an RM within five months is a rational choice. In addition, 111 
SPACs listed on the US stock exchanges between 2006 and 2009 are analyzed. Recall that a 
typical SPAC has eighteen months deadline to locate a target, otherwise the fund is liquidated 
and the proceeds are returned to the shareholders. The authors report that SPAC investors 
incur negative returns upon consummation of an RM. Therefore, in contrast with shell firms, 
SPACs offer a risk-free option during the target search period at the expense of the post-
acquisition performance. 
Asquith et al. (2011) analyze the short-term price performance of a sample of RTO companies 
during 1990-2008 and find that the average announcement day return for reverse mergers is 
equivalent to the average first-day return for IPOs. Most of the theories explaining IPO 
underpricing are based on underwriters’ incentives45; these theories do not apply to reverse 
mergers, in which no underwriters participate. According to the authors, the similar initial 
pricing behavior of IPOs and RTOs implies that either a) the current IPO underpricing 
theories are invalid, or b) RMs and IPOs are distinct going-public methods and thus explained 
by distinct theories. 
Motivated by the recent allegations of fraudulent accounting practices surrounding RM 
companies, Schumann et al. (2013) challenge the common perception that only foreign firms 
seeking to enter the US capital markets through back-door listings account for the bad 
reputation of the RM transactions. Indeed, examining a sample of RM firms matched with a 
sample of non-RM firms listed on the US stock exchanges between 1987- 2010, the authors 
find that both domestic and international RM firms exhibit lower accounting quality (higher 
earnings management) than non-RM companies.46 Furthermore, the involvement of a higher 
                                                          
43 For the sake of accuracy, the authors divide trading shell companies into “development stage” and 
“natural” shells, in contrast with SPACs. (see section “Comparative Regulation) 
44 In contrast to the work of Gleason et al. (2005) in which the RM sample consists of larger public 
operating companies.   
45 Concerning IPO underpricing theories see in the same paper, pp. 7-9. For a more comprehensive 
view, see Ritter and Welch (2002), “A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing and Allocations”, pp. 1802-1816. 
 
46 This finding is in line with Warfield (1995) and Richardson (2000) who document a positive 
relationship between the level of information asymmetries and the degree of earnings management. 
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quality auditor seems to serve a monitoring role, as those RM companies that hire Big 4 
auditors display less earnings management behavior and have a higher likelihood of survival 
in the U.S markets. 
One of the few studies on the wealth effects of RMs from the perspective of the private firm 
shareholders is that of Greene (2016), in which RMs are examined in comparison with IPOs 
and sellouts that occurred between 2005 and 2010. The author shows that private firm owners 
that “exit” their firm through the RM method experience significantly less post-exit wealth 
than the wealth that could be gained via an IPO. This finding is attributed to differences in 
pre-exit characteristics of private firms that opt for an RM instead of an IPO47, not to the use 
of RM method itself. In fact, when RMs are closely matched with IPOs, the post-exit wealth 
difference between the two groups disappears. Thus, this paper sheds further light to the 
notion that RMs can be sustainable alternatives to IPOs for certain types of firms. 
Since 2000, the number of Chinese firms entering the US stock exchanges through RMs has 
noticeably increased. According to the PCAOB48, between 2007 and 2011 157 Chinese RMs 
(CRMs) in US markets took place; in contrast, only 56 Chinese companies conducted an IPO 
over the same period. Recent fraud allegations against CRMs prompted researchers to 
elaborate on the characteristics and performance of these investments. 
Using a dataset spanning from 2001 through 2010, Lee et al. (2013) examine CRMs in 
comparison with US RMs and a matched sample of listed companies based on exchange, date 
(of the RM’s first 10-k filing), industry and size. CRMs are on average better capitalized and 
further developed than their US counterparts or their control firms. Three years after listing, 
CRMs outperform the two aforementioned groups in all aspects49 (e.g. profitability, market 
liquidity, stock returns and survival rates). The authors conclude that the negative publicity of 
CRMs is overstated. Within this context, Darrough et al. (2015) show that the fraud 
allegations against certain CRMs had also a negative impact on the stock prices of other non-
deceitful CRMs and U.S listed Chinese IPOs.  
Jindra et al. (2014) compare CRMs with Chinese IPOs (CIPOs) that occurred between 1994-
2010 and find evidence that larger Chinese firms seek IPOs, while smaller Chinese firms seek 
RMs. Interestingly, over the three-year post-listing era, the difference between mean CAR of 
                                                          
47 RM firms tend to be smaller, younger and of lower quality compared to IPOs in line with previous 
studies such as Arellano-Ostoa et al. (2002), Adjei et al. (2008) and Floros and Sastri (2009).  
48 The PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to supervise 
the audits of the public firms in order to enhance investor protection.  
49 These results hold although the sample contains most (81%) of the CRMs that have been accused of 
fraud since 2011.      
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CRMs and mean CAR of CIPOs is not statistically significant. However, CRM firms have 
higher probability of facing class action litigation in the U.S. 
Givoly et al. (2014) find that RM firms exhibit lower accrual quality than matched non-RM 
firms; yet, within the RM sample, no significant difference in the financial reporting quality 
between foreign RM firms and U.S RM firms is detected. Moreover, the accounting quality of 
CRMs is comparable to that of all other RM firms. Likewise, Pollard (2016) finds that the 
inferior financial reporting quality of RMs in the US market derives from the non-Chinese 
RM firms. 
Non-US Evidence 
One of the few studies relied upon non-US data is that of Brown et al. (2010), which consists 
of 174 reverse takeovers (or back-door listings as they are referred) that took place in the 
Australian Stock Exchange between 1992 and 2007. The institutional framework in Australia 
differs from that in North America, as approximately 80 percent of the sample BDL50 firms 
are subject to readmission and prospectus disclosure requirements and also undertake 
concomitant capital raisings. Matching the BDL sample with an IPO sample in terms of size, 
industry and listing year, the authors claim that the Australian market facilitates a more 
accurate comparison between the two-alternative going public mechanisms. In the listing 
year, BDL firms tend to be less liquid and profitable and at an earlier development stage than 
their control IPO firms. Moreover, both BDL and IPO firms exhibit, on average, similar 
degree of underpricing. Thus, when RMs become directly comparable to IPOs, the argument 
that backdoor listings reduce the indirect costs of underpricing becomes questionable. 
Using a sample of 1,455 IPOs and RMs that took place in Canada between 1993 and 2003, 
Carpentier et al. (2012) provide evidence concerning the economic consequences of capital 
market regulation. In contrast to the US case, Canadian securities market is characterized by 
lax initial listing standards. In addition, no formal definition of the RM mechanism is 
stipulated in the Securities Laws or Rules of the responsible exchange Commission; in fact, 
new listings are divided almost equally between the two-alternative going-public routes. 
While both Canadian RMs and IPOs exhibit poor post-merger performance, the former are 
inferior to the latter both in terms of financial and share price performance. The authors 
attribute this underperformance to the larger valuation errors and higher cost of capital 
associated with RM firms. It can, therefore, be deduced that in the context of a deregulated 
                                                          
50 Back door listings or reverse takeovers or reverse mergers. 
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capital market, investments in IPO firms rather in RM firms are less detrimental to the 
investors’ wealth. 
Song et al. (2014) base their research on the assumption that RMs offer an exit strategy to 
venture capitalists similarly to IPOs, as venture capitalists can sell their shareholdings of the 
combined firm in the public upon completion of the mergers. Using data from South Korea, 
where a typical IPO process lasts more than a year since the private companies need to 
comply with stringent prerequisites in order to be admitted for IPO, the authors report that 
VC-backed RM firms are smaller, less profitable and more leveraged than VC-backed IPO 
firms. The authors also find that RMs significantly underperform IPOs in the long term, as 
measured by negative buy-and-hold abnormal returns. These findings are consistent with the 
notion that opaque firms with large information asymmetries prefer the reverse takeover path 
avoiding thus the higher costs incurred and extra time spent in a traditional IPO. 
Appadu et al. (2014) investigate 243 reverse takeovers along with a control sample of IPOs 
listed on the London stock exchange between 1995 and 2012. In contrast with US RTOs, UK 
RTOs are treated similarly to UK IPOs in terms of entry requirements; most UK RTOs 
undertake public offerings at the time of the listing and participate in post-merger corporate 
activities. The authors report three separate groups of RTOs: Mature (or natural) shells, 
SPACs and Synergies. It is noteworthy that while the private companies in the RTO sample 
are generally smaller and less profitable than their IPO counterparts, synergy RTOs are 
equivalent in size and more profitable than their control IPO firms. Furthermore, no 
significant differences between RTOs and matched IPOs in terms of long-term stock price 
performance and survival rates are detected. The authors conclude that the adoption of higher 
transparency standards may positively impact the profile of RTOs, rendering them a true 
alternative to IPOs. 
Recently, Dasilas et al. (2017) analyze for the first time the wealth effects of reverse 
takeovers employing pan-European data. The authors report significant positive returns for 
the shareholders of the public firms involved in reverse takeovers surrounding the merger 
announcement dates. These wealth gains remain statistically significant even when reverse 
takeovers in the UK and the rest of Europe are examined separately, suggesting that positive 
RM announcement effects are a broader phenomenon. Moreover, a positive relationship 
between corporate governance standards and market reaction to RM announcements is 
documented, implying that investors in public firms engaged in RMs are willing to pay higher 
premiums when deals take place in countries with stricter investor protection mechanisms. 
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However, two years upon completion of the merger, the new combined entities exhibit poor 
performance both in terms of stock returns and various financial measures.  
SECTION 5 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our study focuses on the effective (and completed) reverse takeovers51 and initial public 
offerings52 that took place in Europe between 1996 and 2015.53 To begin with, the RTOs’54 
announcements were culled from the Thomson One database. After having imposed the three 
restrictions that we stated above, the initial sample consisted of 492 deals. However, we 
excluded all those cases, which were considered either as ordinary acquisitions or had missing 
data for both their share prices and key fundamentals, as did Gleason et al. (2005) and Dasilas 
et al. (2017). Thus, our final sample consists of 224 RTO deals. Next, we matched each RTO 
with one IPO which would be comparable. For this reason, we set the following three criteria 
for each match: a) to be from the same country, b) to be from the same macro industry, and c) 
the total assets to be as close as possible.55 All fundamentals and stock prices for RTOs and 
their control IPOs were derived mainly from the Bloomberg database, while in some cases the 
contribution of Thomson One database was needed. 
Time illustration 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the deals of RTOs and matched IPOs that took place per 
year over the period 1996-2015. Among the 20 examined years, IPOs and RTOs mainly took 
place in 2007 and 2000 respectively, being 27 and 25 deals per category. The RTOs of the 
periods 1999-2002 and 2005-2008 represent approximately 30.36% and 29.02% of the total 
number of deals or otherwise 59.38% of the total number of deals for the entire period under 
examination. These two peaks in the total number of RM deals are triggered by the general 
conditions in the stock market of those periods (Dasilas et al., 2017). The peaks of the IPOs 
are quite close to those of the RTOs. More specifically, the two periods that mainly firms 
preferred to go public through an IPO were from 1998 till 2000 (50 deals or 22.32%) and 
                                                          
51 For the RTOs, we required both private and public firms to be located in Europe. 
52 For the IPOs, the new entity had to be located in Europe. 
53 For practical reasons, we extended our dataset till September of 2017, in order to have as much 
available data as possible for the long-term stock price and operating performance over 24 months 
after each deal took place. 
54 For RTOs, we supposed that a private entity merged with a public one to create a combined public 
company which is controlled by the old private (Dasilas et al., 2017). 
55 According to Thomson One database, during the period 1996-2015 9041 IPOs were conducted in 
Europe. From this pool, we spotted 224 IPO cases that were well matched with our RTO sample. 
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between 2004 and 2007 (93 deals or 41.52%). The explanation of the aforementioned 
unprecedented growths could be again the buoyant stock market conditions, given that the 
periods with the most IPOs and RTOs are almost identical. It is worth mentioning, that even 
after the financial crisis in 2008, the number of deals in both categories remained quite high.56 
Table 1: Distribution of the deal announcements in Europe 1996-2015. 
Year No. of RTOs % No. of IPOs % 
1996 1 0.45% 2 0.89% 
1997 10 4.46% 4 1.79% 
1998 7 3.13% 10 4.46% 
1999 14 6.25% 6 2.68% 
2000 25 11.16% 25 11.16% 
2001 18 8.04% 9 4.02% 
2002 11 4.91% 7 3.13% 
2003 8 3.57% 1 0.45% 
2004 7 3.13% 19 8.48% 
2005 22 9.82% 23 10.27% 
2006 17 7.59% 24 10.71% 
2007 13 5.80% 27 12.05% 
2008 13 5.80% 2 0.89% 
2009 9 4.02% 6 2.68% 
2010 12 5.36% 14 6.25% 
2011 11 4.91% 4 1.79% 
2012 6 2.68% 7 3.13% 
2013 6 2.68% 8 3.57% 
2014 9 4.02% 17 7.59% 
2015 5 2.23% 9 4.02% 
Total 224 100% 224 100% 
 
                                                          
56 In line with Feldman (2006) and Semenenko (2011), who argue that reverse takeovers exist in all 
markets. 
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Origin illustration 
Table 2  presents the distribution of reverse takeovers (the private and public entities) and the 
initial public offerings across the country of origin. UK seems to be the most popular host 
country for the RTOs with 167 private and 154 public companies involved in a deal. Sweden 
and Spain follow the UK market by holding the second and third positions respectively. In the 
fourth positions, Germany and Poland have both 4 deals. It is important to mention that UK 
market represents almost three- fourths of the total amount of deals that took place between 
1996 and 2015. It is obvious that the most IPOs in our study come from the UK as well as the 
rest have the same origin with that of the private firms of the RTO deals, as that was one of 
our principal criteria for the creation of our matched sample. 
Table 2: Distribution by country. 
Country IPOs Private firms  Public firms 
Belgium 3 3 6 
Czech Republic - - 1 
Denmark 3 3 1 
Finland 3 3 3 
France 3 3 3 
Germany 4 4 6 
Ireland Rep. - - 3 
Isle of Man - - 2 
Italy 2 2 2 
Netherlands 3 3 4 
Norway 3 3 5 
Poland 4 4 3 
Russian Fed. - - 2 
Spain 5 5 6 
Sweden 22 22 21 
Switzerland 2 2 2 
United Kingdom 167 167 154 
Total 224 224 224 
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In Table 3, we observe that 12% of the 224 firms merged with a foreign company. The vast 
majority of the companies preferred to expand domestically, by acquiring a private firm 
operating in the same country. Our results for the cross-border RTOs could be explained as a 
desire for 26 companies to either expand in a different market or to access a new capital 
market. It is worth noting that the most cross-border deals were between countries that are 
neighbors, i.e. France and Germany, Germany and Belgium, Sweden and Norway, France and 
Spain, Isle of Man and Ireland Republic with the UK, etc. Thus, probably those deals were 
indeed a way for the firms to expand in the countries with which they border. 
Table 3: Distribution between cross-border and domestic RTO deals. 
 RTOs % 
Cross-border 26 12% 
Domestic 198 88% 
Macro and Mid industry illustration 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the RTOs and their matched IPOs among the macro 
industries and sectors in a descending order. One fifth of the total sample or 46 firms opted to 
merge with a firm or proceeded to an initial public offering at the industry of high technology. 
15.63% of the deals took place in the financial industry. The third position was hold by the 
consumer products and services and the media and technology sectors, with 24 deals for each 
of the two sectors.  
Table 4: Distribution by macro industry and sector. 
Macro Industry No. of firms % 
High Technology 46 20.54% 
Financials 35 15.63% 
Consumer products and services 24 10.71% 
Media and Entertainment 24 10.71% 
Healthcare 17 7.59% 
Telecommunications 15 6.70% 
Industrials 14 6.25% 
Materials 12 5.36% 
Energy and Power 11 4.91% 
Real Estate 11 4.91% 
Consumer staples 9 4.02% 
30 
 
Retail 5 2.23% 
Government and Agencies 1 0.45% 
Total 224 100% 
 
Table 5 displays the distribution of the mid industries and sectors for each IPO and RTO deal 
during the period 1996- 2015. In this table, we observe that there is a higher distribution for 
the same number of firms, as the firms are separated to 50 different mid industries, while they 
were distributed to only 13 macro industries. More specifically, there are 25 deals that took 
place in mid industries with just 1 or 2 firms in total. 
Table 5: Distribution by mid industry and sector. 
Mid Industry No. of firms % 
Professional Services 16 7.14% 
Software 15 6.70% 
Other Financials 14 6.25% 
Internet Software and Services 13 5.80% 
Other Real Estate 10 4.46% 
Asset Management 9 4.02% 
Metals and Mining 8 3.57% 
Telecommunications Services 8 3.57% 
Advertising & Marketing 7 3.13% 
IT Consulting & Services 7 3.13% 
Oil & Gas 7 3.13% 
Other Consumer Products 7 3.13% 
Recreation & Leisure 7 3.13% 
Building, Construction & Engineering 5 2.23% 
Food and Beverage 5 2.23% 
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 5 2.23% 
Insurance 5 2.23% 
Motion Pictures and Audio Visual 5 2.23% 
Pharmaceuticals 5 2.23% 
Biotechnology 4 1.79% 
Brokerage 4 1.79% 
Computers & Peripherals 4 1.79% 
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Transportation & Infrastructure 4 1.79% 
Wireless 4 1.79% 
Alternative Financial Investments 3 1.34% 
E-commerce / B2B 3 1.34% 
Electronics 3 1.34% 
Healthcare Providers & Services (HMOs) 3 1.34% 
Machinery 3 1.34% 
Publishing 3 1.34% 
Telecommunications Equipment 3 1.34% 
Automotive Retailing 2 0.89% 
Chemicals 2 0.89% 
Food & Beverage Retailing 2 0.89% 
Hotels and Lodging 2 0.89% 
Power 2 0.89% 
Textiles and Apparel 2 0.89% 
Agriculture & Livestock 1 0.45% 
Automobiles & Components 1 0.45% 
Household & Personal Products 1 0.45% 
Non-Residential 1 0.45% 
Other Industrials 1 0.45% 
Other Materials 1 0.45% 
Other Retailing 1 0.45% 
Paper and Forest Products 1 0.45% 
Petrochemicals 1 0.45% 
Pipelines 1 0.45% 
Public Administration 1 0.45% 
Semiconductors 1 0.45% 
Travel Services 1 0.45% 
Total 224 100% 
Table 6 presents the number of deals that took place among the same macro or mid industry. 
We observe that 93 firms or approximately 41.52% of the total companies merged with an 
entity of the same macro industry, showing that the main motive of those entities is to 
broaden their market share in the same sector and are industrial focused (Dasilas et al., 2017). 
In addition, 72.04% or 67 of the (public) firms that belong to the same macro industry as their 
private counterparties had also the same mid industry, while 16.13% of them had quite similar 
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mid industries. However, the vast-majority of the reverse merged firms (approximately 
58.04% of the total firms) opted to merge with an entity from a different macro industry.  
Table 6: Number of deals within the same industry. 
Macro industry No. of deals Mid industry No. of deals 
Same 93 Same  67 
Quite similar 1 Quite similar 15 
Cross industry 130 Cross industry 142 
Total 224 Total 224 
Key fundamental characteristics 
Table 7 presents some key fundamentals for the year 057 of the RTO deals. The average return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are -27.74% and -32.59% respectively. The 
negative sign in front of the values of ROA and ROE ratios indicates that the public 
companies suffer from low-quality management. Thus, there is inefficiency to generate 
revenues and earnings by using the assets of the firm and, therefore the entities are suffering 
losses, being on average unprofitable and poor performers. Moreover, the average cash to 
total assets ratio is 16.49% revealing the low liquidity of the entities. The debt to total assets 
ratio is 16.17%, demonstrating that the public companies do not make extensive use of 
external financing to their business. The current, quick and cash ratios are on average higher 
than 1 and we could thus assume that the companies are well-positioned to cover their short-
term liabilities. The asset turnover ratio is on average 65.24%, implying that the firms are 
generating less than one euro of revenue per euro of assets. Moreover, we observe that the 
total asset bases of the public entities are quite low and are approximately € 326.17 million. 
Taking into account all the key fundamentals, we conclude that the public entity’s financial 
position in the year of the merger is extremely poor. To recover from these losses, the strong 
financial position of the private company is considered to be the most powerful motive for the 
public firm to be involved in a reverse merger deal.  
Table 7: Selective key fundamentals for the year 0 of the RTO deals. 
 Mean Median No. Max Min Std. Dev. 
ROA (%) -27.74 -1.65 154 52.78 -517.09 82.64 
ROE (%) -32.59 -2.8 127 156.83 -829.55 86.1 
CASH/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 16.49 9.89 197 76.3 0 17.44 
                                                          
57 The year 0 for each reverse takeover deal is the year that the deal became effective. 
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CURRENT  2.61 1.225 190 42.49 0.3 4.46 
QUICK  1.95 0.78 190 28.64 0.02 3.57 
CASH 1.59 0.325 190 28.64 0 3.57 
DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 16.17 7.195 184 80.85 0 19.73 
ASSET TURNOVER (%) 65.24 41.29 183 490.54 0 75.83 
ALTMAN'S Z Score 3.83 2.515 104 70.8 -33.79 11.18 
TOTAL ASSETS (in € million) 326.17 30.85 222 14128.8 0.08 1325.17 
Table 8  depicts some major fundamentals for the year 058 of the IPO deals. The average ROA 
and ROE are negative for the companies that proceeded to an initial public offering as well. 
Nevertheless, IPO companies suffered lower losses than the losses incurred by their RTO 
counterparts, implying that the quality of the management is a bit higher than that of the 
reverse merged firms. Furthermore, we observe higher performance in the liquidity measures 
and thus the firms are sufficiently able to meet their current obligations. Altman’s Z score is 
almost three times higher than the equivalent score of the public firms involved in RTO 
transactions. Finally, comparing the total assets of the firms that went public through IPOs 
with those of the combined entities that derived from reverse mergers, we see that their 
average amounts are close enough, implying that the matched sample has similar 
characteristics for the rest analysis in our study. 
Table 8: Selective key fundamentals for the year 0 of the IPO deals. 
 Mean Median No. Max Min Std. 
Dev. 
ROA (%) -2.83 3.27 161 27.7 -123.02 23.62 
ROE (%) -0.94 7.22 120 36.83 -166.56 32.64 
CASH/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 26.64 17.83 209 99.55 0.2 25.77 
CURRENT 4.22 2.22 202 47.09 0.64 6.77 
QUICK 3.5 1.47 201 41.67 0.08 6.51 
CASH 2.97 0.92 202 41.64 0.01 6.46 
DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 16.03 7.45 197 94.57 0 20.26 
ASSET TURNOVER (%) 74.63 54.06 199 353.33 0 72.05 
ALTMAN'S Z Score 10.91 6.24 85 146.9 0.75 19.96 
TOTAL ASSETS (in € million) 297.14 50.07 222 15627.74 0.9 1232.37 
 
                                                          
58 The year 0 for each initial public offer is the year that the deal became effective. 
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In the last section of the descriptive statistics analysis of our sample, we present some specific 
characteristics for the RTO and IPO deals. More specifically, in the cases of RTOs, Table 9 
shows the number of public and private companies that had the assistance of a financial 
advisor in order to succeed in their deal. As we can see, the majority of the public entities 
(62.5% of the total sample) or 140 public firms had an advisor for their financial issues. On 
the other hand, 56.25% or 126 private companies preferred not to use external financial 
advisors to consult them for their RTO deal. In general, public entities of the transaction seek 
for a consultation more often than the private firm and there are cases, in which the very same 
firm might receive consultation from more than one financial advisor. 
Table 9: Public and private firms that had a financial advisor. 
 Private firm Public firm 
Financial advisor 98 140 
No financial advisor 126 84 
Total 224 224 
Table 10 indicates the number of book runners and managers that had been requested by each 
company that went public. We do not comment the part of the firms for which the databases 
gave us a result of either “not available” or “not applicable”. In general, we can see that the 
vast-majority of the firms had at least one book runner and one manager. UBS, Morgan 
Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse were the most frequently used 
book runners. Companies that used more than one manager usually had some global 
coordinators, some co-managers, some co-lead managers or some joint book runners. It is 
remarkable that 36 firms chose four or more managers to handle their IPO procedure. 
However, it is worth mentioning that there is no correlation or empirical evidence (in our 
sample) suggesting that the more managers or book runners a firm chose, the higher the 
amount of the deal was. 
Table 10: Number of Bookrunners and managers per initial public offer. 
No. of Bookrunners IPOs No. of Managers IPOs 
Not available/ Not applicable 91 Not available/ Not applicable 64 
1 106 1 80 
2 14 2 24 
3 8 3 20 
4 3 4 13 
5 2 5 7 
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6 0 6 7 
7 0 7 5 
8 0 8 1 
10 0 10 2 
13 0 13 1 
Methodology 
Univariate method 
We first examine whether RTOs differ significantly from their control IPO counterparts in 
terms of financial and operating characteristics during the year of the going public 
transactions, by using t-tests for differences in means. 
Short-term performance - Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
To measure the share price reaction to the announcement of a reverse takeover we use the 
classical event study methodology that has been introduced by Brown and Warner (1985) in 
order to evaluate the wealth effects of RM announcements on the wealth of the shareholders 
of the public firms. In our case, we use the market model, the market-adjusted returns model 
and the buy-and-hold abnormal return model to calculate the stock price reactions. 
According to the market model, which is used as a return-generating approach, we calculated 
the abnormal returns as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
The abnormal returns based on the market-adjusted model are calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Where in both models: 
ARit is the abnormal return,  
Rit is the security return i at time t,  
Rmt is the return of the stock market at the time t as it is provided by the main index of each 
European country. 
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The parameters 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑏𝑖 are estimated using the Scholes and Williams (1977) technique 
which takes into account the thin trading problem, a commonly observed problem in 
companies with low trading activity. The parameters of the market model are estimated by 
regressing the returns of each share with the return of the stock market for the period that 
ranges from t = -250 to t = -11, where t = 0 is the announcement date for the event. 
The average abnormal returns (AAR) of the sample can be calculated as: 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where N is the number of public entities announcing a RTO. 
We then calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the event windows below: (-
10, -1), (+1, +10), (-5, -1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0). The main reason of calculating CARs 
both prior and after the RM announcement date is to capture any potential information that 
leaks or sluggish the market reaction to RTO announcements. The CARs are calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑇 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
Long-term performance - Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
To gauge the stock price reaction to RTOs and IPOs, we use the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) method. More specifically, we compute the BHARs over 6, 12, 18 and 24 
months after the going-public event. BHARs are computed as the difference between the 
compounded actual return of the announcing company and the compounded return of the 
market and are calculated using the formula below: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡) −  ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
Where: 
Rit is the time t arithmetic mean on security i, 
Rmt is the time t arithmetic return on the benchmark. 
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In order to test the statistical significance of BHARs, we calculate the t-statistics for the 
different normal return estimation procedures. Given that in our case there is a positive 
skewness59, the results will be misspecified. Thus, we compute the skewness adjusted t-
statistic as60: 
𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠−𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 = √𝑁 ∗ (𝑆 +
1
3
∗ 𝛾 ∗ 𝑆2 +
1
6𝑁
∗ 𝛾) 
Where: 
N is the total number of the public companies announcing a RTO or the total number of the 
IPOs, depending on the sample we work with, 
𝑆 =  
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝜎∗𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡
 , 
𝛾 is the coefficient of skewness, estimated as: ∑ =𝑁𝑖=1
(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡)
3
𝑁∗𝜎∗𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡
3  
ABHARt is the sample mean, 
σ*BHARt is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the buy-and-hold returns. 
Post-going public operating performance 
We assess the long-term performance per deal, by employing some key fundamental ratios for 
the years 0, 1 and 2 after the effective day of the event. To reduce the effects of outliers, we 
trim all financials by 1.5% based upon the final RTO and matched IPO samples.  
UK vs non-UK comparison 
After having conducted our study in the whole sample, we examine whether the results in our 
sample are UK driven, given that the majority of the firms come from the UK. For this 
reason, we split our sample into UK and non-UK firms and we proceed to the same tests as 
before. 
 
                                                          
59 Because of the employment of the market returns to estimate normal returns, the distribution of 
the long-run abnormal returns is positively skewed (Dasilas et al., 2017). 
60 Pastor-Llorca and Martı́n-Ugedo (2004) 
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T-tests for differences in means and medians 
We use the two-tailed test for differences in means and the Mann–Whitney Wilcoxon test for 
differences in medians to see whether there are significant differences between RTOs and 
their matched IPOs in terms of long-term price reaction and post-going public operating 
performance.  
Survival rates 
We report the survival rates of RTOs and their matched IPOs based on the evidence we found 
on Bloomberg database according to two criteria. In particular, a company has survived if a) it 
has not been delisted or b) it has not been merged or acquired by a third entity for a period of 
two years after the going-public event.  
First day returns 
We compute the first-day returns to analyze the degree of underpricing between the two-
alternative going public mechanisms. First-day returns for RTO firms are the percentage 
change in the price at the close of the effective day of the RM transaction (that is the first 
trading day of the new combined entity) from the closing price on the day before. For IPOs, 
the first-day return is calculated as the percentage change in the closing price at the first day 
of trading as a newly listed firm from the offer price.  
SECTION 6  
Empirical Results and analysis 
We examine whether the key fundamental characteristics of RTOs and IPOs differ 
significantly at the year 0, which is the year of the going public transaction. Table 11 shows 
the results of the univariate tests for some selective fundamentals. The test for differences in 
means indicate that the RTO companies do not differ significantly from their matched IPOs in 
terms of total assets in the year of going public, which is not surprising as the two samples 
were sized matched. In general, both categories seem to have negative profitability as denoted 
by the ROA and ROE ratios. However, RTOs are significantly less profitable than their 
matched IPOs. In the table, there is also information about liquidity, leverage, asset use 
efficiency and distress of the two categories. The tests for differences in means indicate that 
in all ratios (expect for leverage and asset use efficiency), the differences between the two 
groups are significant at the 1% level. In general, we could conclude that IPOs have higher 
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performance, on average, than their matched RTOs at the beginning of their lives as public 
companies. 
Table 11: Univariate results for selective key fundamentals of RTOs and IPOs at the year of going public. 
 Mean of RTOs Mean of IPOs RTOs vs IPOs 
T-Statistic 
p value for 
differences in means 
ROA (%) -27.74 -2.83 3.66 0.000** 
ROE (%) -32.59 -0.94 -3.89 0.000*** 
CASH/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 16.49 26.64 -4.61 0.000*** 
CURRENT 2.61 4.22 -2.77 0.006*** 
QUICK 1.95 3.5 -2.91 0.004*** 
CASH 1.59 2.97 -2.61 0.01*** 
DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS (%) 16.17 16.03 0.07 0.95 
ASSET TURNOVER (%) 65.24 74.63 -1.24 0.216 
ALTMAN'S Z Score 3.83 10.91 -3.06 0.003*** 
TOTAL ASSETS (in € million) 326.17 297.14 0.81 0.811 
Short term price performance analysis 
Stock price reaction to RTOs announcements 
In this section, we examine the short-term impact of RTO announcements on public firms’ 
stock prices. Table 12 and Table 13 report the results from the analysis of the 21 days 
surrounding the event, i.e. the period of days from the day -10 till the day +10 for the reverse 
merged companies under examination in order to capture potential information leakages or 
sluggish market reaction to RTOs announcements not only prior but also after the reverse 
merger deals. 
For the aforementioned period of the 21 days, the day 0 is the day that the reverse takeover 
deal has been announced. We examine 6 subsamples, which we call event windows and they 
are: (-10, -1), (+1, +10), (-5,-1), (+1, +5), (-1, +1) and (-1, 0). More specifically, Table 12 
reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) according to the market model and whether 
the CARs are significant for each of the periods. In addition to the market model, in Table 13, 
we show the CARs and their t-statistic values for the adjusted market model. 
Looking at the market model, we observe that the abnormal returns for the days -1, 0 and +1 
are 1.34%, 3.66% and 2.15% respectively and they are all statistically significant at the 1% 
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level. Looking at the CARs for the event windows (-1, +1) and (-1, 0), we observe that they 
are equal to 7.14% and close to 5% respectively. Both event windows are significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the CAR of the event period of (-10, -1) is 3.66%, while on the other 
hand the CAR of (+1, +10) is 0.95%. In the first case the result is significant at the 1% level, 
while in the event window of (+1, +10), the result seems to be insignificant at any level. For 
the event windows of (-5, -1) and (+1, +5), we observe that the CARs are 3.45% and 1.89% 
respectively, being significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
For days -1, 0 and +1, using the market-adjusted model we observe that the respective 
abnormal returns are 1.5%, 4.66% and 4.31%. The AR of the day -1 is significant at the 5% 
level. Finally, the CARs of the (-1, +1) and (-1, 0) event windows are 10.51% and 6.21% and 
they are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. For the rest periods, the results are 
quite close to those of the previous analysis and range from 3% to 4.5%.  
In general, we could conclude that the market-adjusted model gives higher and less 
significant CARs compared to the market model. However, in all event windows the results 
are the same, apart from the period of (-5, -1) and (+1, +5), which turns to be insignificant at 
the market-adjusted model.  
Table 12: Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns around reverse mergers (Market Model). 
Full sample of reverse takeovers (N=224) 
 AR% t-Statistic 
-1 1.34*** 4.02 
0 3.66*** 11.02 
1 2.15*** 6.46 
 
Interval CAR% t-Statistic 
(-10,-1) 3.66*** 3.49 
(-5,-1) 3.45*** 4.65 
(+1,+5) 1.89** 2.55 
(+1,+10) 0.95 0.01 
(-1,+1) 7.14*** 12.42 
(-1,0) 5*** 10.64 
This table reports abnormal returns (in %) according to the market model. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 13:Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns around reverse mergers (Market Adjusted Model). 
Full sample of reverse takeovers (N=224) 
 AR% t-Statistic 
-1 1.55** 2.09 
0 4.66 1.33 
1 4.31 1.05 
 
Interval CAR% t-Statistic 
(-10,-1) 3.69* 1.84 
(-5,-1) 3.86 0.89 
(+1,+5) 4.52 1.04 
(+1,+10) 3.08 0.03 
(-1,+1) 10.51*** 3.57 
(-1,0) 6.21** 2.00 
This table reports abnormal returns (in %) according to the market adjusted model. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Undoubtedly, RTOs’ announcements are wealth-increasing transactions for the public firm’s 
shareholders, in line with previous literature [e.g. Gleason et al., (2005), Song et al., (2014), 
Dasilas et al., (2017)]. The abnormal returns emanated from reverse mergers can be evaluated 
in conjunction with the abnormal returns associated with traditional mergers and acquisitions. 
Generally, the abnormal returns to bidders are insignificant whereas (publicly traded) targets 
receive all the positive wealth effects from the transactions.61 However, Chang et al. (1998) 
examine takeovers of privately held targets and show that bidders experience positive and 
significant abnormal returns at the takeover announcement date. In cases where a new block 
holder arises from the target, the average abnormal returns for the bidders are 4.96 %.62 The 
authors attribute these positive abnormal bidder returns to the monitoring hypothesis, 
according to which the emergence of a new block holder leads to more efficient monitoring of 
management and thus higher firm value. This is particularly relevant to the structure of an 
RTO transaction, where the private firm’s shareholders become the majority shareholders of 
the enlarged entities; they thereby have the power to change the board composition and 
monitor the managers. In this sense, efficiency gains can derive from the expertise of the new 
block holders and these gains are depicted in the positive CARs around the RTO 
announcement date. Similarly, Dasilas et al. (2017) show that the market reaction to reverse 
takeovers announcements during the recent financial crisis is more positive than equivalent 
                                                          
61 See for instance: Travlos (1987), Stulz et al. (1990), Goergen et al. (2004).  
62 For the same window [-1, 0], we find a statistically significant CAR of 5%. 
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announcements occurred before the crisis; investors thus believe that the new managers have 
the appropriate skills to restructure financially distressed public companies.          
First day returns of RMs versus IPOs 
In this sub-section we analyze the degree of underpricing between the two-alternative going 
public mechanisms by computing first trading day returns. As mentioned before, first-day 
returns for RTO firms are the percentage change in the price at the close of the effective day 
of the RM transaction (that is the first trading day of the new combined entity) from the 
closing price on the day before. For IPOs, the first day return is calculated as the percentage 
change in the closing price at the first day of trading as a newly listed firm from the offer 
price.63 Table 14 displays first trading day returns for RMs and their matched IPOs. 
Table 14:First day returns. 
Sample of reverse takeovers and matched sample of IPOs (N=85) 
RTO sample mean returns 
(RTO sample median returns) 
IPO sample mean returns 
(IPO sample median returns) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(Wilcoxon p value for 
    differences in medians) 
3.8% 
(0.3%) 
16.41% 
(7.74%) 
0.083* 
(0.000)*** 
This table reports first day returns (in %). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
The mean (median) first trading day return of the RTO sample is 3.8% (0.3%), while the 
mean (median) first trading day return of the control IPO sample is 16.41% (7.74%).64 The 
tests for differences in means and medians denote that the first trading day returns for RTOs 
are significantly lower than that for their matched IPOs (at the 10% level regarding means and 
at the 1% level regarding medians). Our results are consistent with the findings of Gleason et 
al. (2006), who find that the mean (median) first day returns of US RMs and their matched 
                                                          
63 Offer prices for IPO firms were derived from IPO prospectuses. We managed to find and verify offer 
prices for 85 IPOs. Thus, in order for our analysis to be as comparable as possible, we matched only 
these 85 IPOs with their corresponding RTOs. 
64 For a holistic view of IPOs’ initial underpricing across different countries, see Ritter (2003), 
“Differences between European and American IPO markets”, pp.423-425. 
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IPO counterparts are 7.88% (2.12%) and 23.05% (9.15%) respectively; this difference is also 
statistically significant. The authors provide two reasons for the lower first day returns of 
RTO firms: a) a reverse merger is an expected event. Part of the initial underpricing may be 
absorbed in the returns to the public vehicle firm surrounding the announcement of the 
merger. Our findings in the previous part concerning positive and statistically significant 
CARs around the RM announcement dates corroborate this argument. b) The value of the RM 
transaction is determined by the counterparties in advance, while the offer price in an IPO is 
determined by the underwriters just before the first trading day. Thus, investors have more 
certainty when assessing RM investments than IPO investments.  
In the same context, Brown et al. (2010) show that the median first day returns for RMs and 
control IPOs in Australia are 5% and 10.5% respectively, while this difference is statistically 
significant. The authors contend that the requirement of prospectus release in most RTO cases 
would impact on the information environment of these firms in the sense that larger publicity 
would lead to lower valuation uncertainty and ultimately lower degree of underpricing.65 This 
is probable why in our analysis the first-day returns for both European RMs and IPOs are 
lower than the equivalent of US RMs and IPOs, as reported by Gleason et al. (2006). 
Furthermore, Floros and Sastri (2010) support an interesting explanation concerning the lower 
underpricing endured by RM owners. Particularly, they show that the owners of the new 
enlarged entities mitigate the initial mispricing by reducing the percentage of registered 
shares distributed as common and outstanding upon completion of the RM.   
Overall, the positive and significant CARs surrounding the RM announcement date in 
conjunction with the significantly lower first-day returns of the combined entities compared 
to their IPO counterparts deconstruct the common argument that RTOs incur lower indirect 
costs (in terms of lower degree of underpricing). On the other hand, the elimination of this 
supposed advantage renders RTOs a true alternative to IPOs.    
 
                                                          
65 Under this notion of larger publicity, Floros and Sapp (2011) split their US RTO sample into those 
public shell firms that announce formally an anticipated RM and those who do not. In the cases where 
the announcement date precedes the effective date of the merger, the authors report positive and 
significant CARs around the announcement date. However, over the windows [-30,+30] and [-5,+5] 
surrounding the effective date of the merger, the CARs for these firms are not as large as the 
equivalent CARs for those firms that do not announce a letter of intent. Particularly, the CARs for the 
latter (former) are 48.1% (17.4%) and 28.94% (18.9%) for the windows [-30, +30] and [-5, +5] 
respectively. Thus, a part of the expected return upon consummation of the RM transaction has 
already been captured in the first return around the announcement date. 
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Long-term price performance analysis 
BHARs of RTOs vs. IPOs 
In this section, we analyze the long-term price performance of RTOs and their matched IPOs, 
by calculating the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the periods of 6, 12, 18 and 24 
months after the going-public event. In Table 15, 16 and 17 we illustrate the long-term impact 
of the alternative going-public mechanisms on the stock price behavior of the public 
companies. Apart from the full sample, we divide the companies into UK and non-UK in 
order to observe any potential differences between the two subsamples.  
Starting from the full sample, Table 15 shows that mean BHARs of IPOs are negative for 
each period and statistically significant at the 1% level. At the same table, it is observed that 
the average BHARs per semester for the RTOs are negative as well, but they are significant at 
10% and 1% levels for the 6 and 24 months respectively. At both cases of IPOs and RTOs the 
BHARs are decreasing from semester to semester by almost 3.5% units and it is almost triple 
after two years compared to the six first months. Moreover, the BHARs for the first two 
periods are quite close, but in the second year a slight deviation between the averages of the 
two categories is observed. The tests for differences in mean BHARs between RTOs and 
IPOs indicate that the performance of both alternatives is comparable for the entire period 
under examination. 
In Table 16, we compare and contrast the average BHARs per semester for RTOs and their 
control IPOs for the UK sub-sample. In Table 17, we provide similar analysis for the non-UK 
sub-sample. In the UK case, all BHARs are negative, apart from that of the 6 months period 
(0.001%). In general, the BHARs of both IPOs and RTOs follow a declining trend. More 
specifically, the UK RTOs have a BHAR of -4.07% and -14.98% after 1 and 2 years 
respectively, while the UK IPOs’ BHARs are equal to -8.05% and -19.84% for the same 
periods. The difference between the mean RTO BHARs and the mean IPO BHARs is not 
statistically significant at any period. Turning to the non-UK sample, it seems to have a 
negative trend at the average BHAR values and they are all significant. More specifically, the 
non-UK RTOs’ BHARs change from -23.13% at the end of the first semester to -35.3% at the 
end of the second year. The non-UK IPOs’ BHARs moved from -9.64% at the first six 
months to -19.49% at the end of the 24 months. The mean RTO BHARs are not significantly 
different from the mean IPO BHARs at any examined period. 
To conclude, we could say that at the end of the second year RTOs display almost identical 
losses (-21.48%) to that of their matched IPOs, which suffer losses of -19.80%. In addition, 
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they both lose an average of 10.24% at the end of the first 12 months. Furthermore, it seems 
that UK RTOs exhibited the best performance compared to the rest companies. More 
specifically, at the end of the 4th semester after going public, the UK RTOs have a BHAR of -
14.98% which is the highest BHAR compared to the UK IPOs (-19.84%) and the non-UK 
IPOs (-19.49%) and less than half of the non-UK RTOs, which had an average BHAR of -
35.3%. In sum, the long-run price performance of RTOs is comparable to that of their 
matched IPOs in all sub-periods under examination. By splitting the overall RTO and IPO 
population into UK and non-UK samples, we demonstrate that the equivalent performance of 
the two-alternative going-public routes is non-UK-driven, but rather a pan-European 
phenomenon.    
Table 15: BHARs of RTOs vs. matched IPOs (full sample). 
N=224 
Period (in 
months) 
RTO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
IPO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
p value for 
differences in means 
24 -21.48*** -3.36 -19.80*** -4.45 0.852 
18 -11.51 -1.39 -16.71*** -3.96 0.567 
12 -10.22 -1.50 -10.26*** -2.89 0.996 
6 -7.14* -1.69 -6.67*** -3.11 0.920 
This table reports BHARs (in %) for 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the going-public event. Adjusted t-statistic is calculated as in 
Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo (2004). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
Table 16: BHARs of RTOs vs. matched IPOs (UK sample). 
N=167 
Period (in 
months) 
RTO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
IPO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
p value for 
differences in means 
24 -14.98* -1.85 -19.84*** -3.73 0.610 
18 -3.07 -0.23 -18.05*** -3.57 0.194 
12 -4.07 -0.49 -8.05* -1.93 0.641 
6 0.001 0.02 -5.39** -2.15 0.309 
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This table reports BHARs (in %) for 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the going-public event. Adjusted t-statistic is calculated as in 
Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo (2004). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
Table 17: BHARs of RTOs vs. matched IPOs (non-UK sample). 
N=57 
Period (in 
months) 
RTO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
IPO 
sample 
mean 
BHARs 
Adjusted t-
statistic 
p value for 
differences in means 
24 -35.3*** -3.45 -19.49** -2.30 0.242 
18 -30.41*** -2.80 -12.63* -1.64 0.194 
12 -24.00* -1.80 -15.82** -2.25 0.593 
6 -23.13*** -2.81 -9.64** -2.33 0.156 
This table reports BHARs (in %) for 6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the going-public event. Adjusted t-statistic is calculated as in 
Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo (2004). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively. 
The long-run underperformance of IPOs and RTOs has been widely documented in the 
relevant literature.6667 Semenenko (2011) provides evidence of the market timing hypothesis 
from the perspective of RTOs.68 Particularly, managers of companies that go public via RMs 
exploit “windows of opportunity” (Loughran & Ritter, 1995) and sell overvalued equity to 
investors. The market corrects downwards the initial mispricing leading to long-run 
underperformance. Moreover, Dasilas et al. (2017) contend that since reverse mergers are 
corporate combinations, the task of reshaping companies with minimal or no actual business     
is challenging. After the completion of the merger shareholders of the combined entities view 
with mistrust the managers’ restructuring initiatives putting thus downward pressure on the 
stock price.                      
Using Korean evidence, Song et al. (2014) find that over 18 months after the going-public 
events the median BHARs for RTOs and their matched IPOs are -72% and -47% respectively 
and the difference is statistically significant. The inferior quality of the firms entering the 
Korean Stock Exchange through RMs seems to play a decisive role in the significantly worse 
long-run price performance of RTOs compared to their control IPOs. This is because until 
                                                          
66 For a concise view of IPOs’ long-run performance across different countries, see Kooli et al. (2004), 
“The aftermarket performance of initial public offerings in Canada”, p.50. 
67 Regarding explanations of IPOs’ long-run underperformance see Ritter and Welch (2002), “A Review 
of IPO Activity, Pricing and Allocations”, pp. 1821-1822. 
68 Concerning market timing in the IPO markets, see: Loughran et al. (1995), Spiess et al. (1995).  
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2006 the minimum listing requirements of firm size and profitability were being applied only 
to IPOs; thus, private companies which could not meet these standards were exploiting the 
back-door alternative. Employing data from the Canadian market, where the initial listing 
requirements are lax and private companies using an RM to go public benefit from prospectus 
and registration exemptions, Carpentier et al. (2010) show that over 3 years after the 
transaction the mean BHARs for RTOs and their control IPOs are -82% and -33% 
respectively and the difference is statistically significant. By contrast, Appadu et al. (2014) 
examine a sample of RTOs vs. matched IPOs collected by the London stock exchange, in 
which the same entry requirements are applied to both IPOs and RTOs. The authors find that 
over 2 years after listing the mean equal-weighted BHARs for RTOs and their IPO 
counterparts are -17% and -16%, respectively. Furthermore, Gleason et al. (2006) show that 
over three years after listing the median equal-weighted BHARs of US RTOs and their 
matched IPOs are -18% and -16% respectively and the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
The aforementioned papers, taken together, provide further support to the argument that the 
stricter the regulatory framework (as in the cases of UK and US in contrast to Korea and 
Canada), the closer the performance of RTOs with that of comparable IPOs. These outcomes 
are in alignment with theories suggesting that companies which comply with higher listing 
standards receive better valuations and incur less mispricing.                                       
Post-going public operating performance of RMs versus IPOs 
In this section, we examine the financial performance of the new combined entities in 
comparison with their control IPOs for the year in which the going-public transaction occurs 
(0 year) and the subsequent two years (+1 and +2). Table 18  reports changes in the 
accounting performance of RTOs and whether these changes are statistically significant. 
Table 19 shows if the change in the values of various financial ratios for RTOs differs 
significantly from the change in the values of the same financial ratios for their matched 
IPOs.6970 
First, the profitability of RTO firms as measured by ROA and ROE improves (becomes less 
negative) in the post-reverse takeover era. Particularly, in both ratios the increase between the 
first full reporting year as a public company and the actual year of the transaction is 
statistically significant, while for the same period the profitability of their control IPOs 
decreases. In fact, over the whole period under examination (0, +2) the increase in the 
                                                          
69 The absolute change. 
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profitability of RTOs is significantly different from the decrease in the profitability of their 
IPO counterparts.  
Turning our attention to the liquidity of RTO firms as calculated by the cash to total assets 
ratio, we report a statistically significant reduction for the period 0, +1. However, for the same 
period the decline in the cash to total assets ratio for the control IPO firms is significantly 
greater than that of the RMs (at the 10% level as indicated by the mean changes). 
Furthermore, we evaluate the ability of RMs and their matched IPOs to comply with their 
short-term obligations by employing three liquidity ratios: current, quick and cash ratio. 
Specifically, two years after the going public transaction, both mean and median liquidity 
ratios of RTO firms reach their lowest values. In fact, over the period 0, +2 the cash ratio 
decreases significantly (at the 10% level). Compared to their matched IPOs, RTOs experience 
significantly lower decline in their liquidity levels, as measured by the difference between the 
change in the values of the three liquidity ratios for RTOs and the change in the values of the 
same liquidity ratios for IPOs for the periods 0,+1 and 0,+2. 
Examining the debt levels of the new enlarged entities, we show that the debt to total assets 
ratio increases over the two years after going public (though insignificantly) and in any case it 
remains close to 20%. However, their IPO counterparts exhibit significantly greater increase 
in their debt levels (as indicated by the mean change in the values of the debt/total assets ratio 
for RTOs versus the mean change in the values of the same ratio for IPOs over the periods 0, 
+1 and 0, +2).71        
In order to assess the efficiency with which RTO companies deploy their assets in generating 
revenues, the asset turnover ratio (ATO) is analyzed. Although both mean and median ATO is 
less than unity during the examination period, it increases significantly over the two years 
after the going-public transaction. Compared to their control IPOs, RTOs display a 
significantly larger increase in ATO (as denoted by the change in the values of ATO for 
RTOs versus the equivalent of IPOs for the periods 0, +1 and 0, +2).  
Looking at the likelihood of bankruptcy as measured by Altman Z-score, RTO firms 
experience a statistically significant decline in distress (at the 10% level) during the period 0, 
+2. Nevertheless, the decline in distress of their IPO counterparts is significantly greater (at 
                                                          
71 In results not reported in tables, two years post-IPO the average debt to total assets ratio is 26%. 
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the 1% level as measured by the median change in the value of Altman Z-score for RTOs 
versus the equivalent of IPOs over the period 0, +2).72    
Table 18: Post-going public operating performance of RTOs (full sample). 
Panel A: Return on Asset surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean -27.74 -12.64 -14.00 Change 15.1 13.74 
Median -1.65 -0.27 -1.45 p value 0.024** 0.044** 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.289 0.682 
 
Panel B: Return on Equity surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean -32.59 -13.58 -19.96 Change 19.01 12.63 
Median -2.8 0.7 -2.31 p value 0.048** 0.201 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.287 0.872 
 
Panel C:Cash to total assets ratio surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 16.49 13.45 15.63 Change -3.04 -0.86 
Median 9.89 8.14 7.55 p value 0.065* 0.642 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.054* 0.227 
 
Panel D: Current ratio surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 2.61 2.13 2.03 Change -0.48 -0.58 
Median 1.23 1.25 1.19 p value 0.224 0.141 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.400 0.154 
 
Panel E: Quick ratio surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 1.95 1.58 1.49 Change -0.37 -0.46 
                                                          
72 In results not reported in tables, two years after the going-public events, RTOs and their matched 
IPOs do not exhibit fundamentally different levels of distress. Particularly, the median Altman Z-score 
for RTOs and IPOs is 2.47 and 3.44 respectively, denoting that both scores are closer to 3 rather to 
1.8.    
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Median 0.78 0.78 0.75 p value 0.269 0.168 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.488 0.344 
 
Panel F: Cash ratio surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 1.59 1.19 1.06 Change -0.4 -0.53 
Median 0.33 0.27 0.27 p value 0.232 0.114 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.08* 0.079* 
 
Panel G: Debt to total assets surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 16.17 17.04 18.97 Change 0.87 2.8 
Median 7.2 11.85 13 p value 0.67 0.186 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.4583 0.1325 
 
Panel H: Asset turnover ratio surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 65.24 80.45 91.94 Change 15.21 26.7 
Median 41.29 62.1 67.84 p value 0.058* 0.004*** 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.007*** 0.001*** 
 
Panel I: Altman’s Z score surrounding the going-public year 
Years 0 1 2 Period (0,+1) (0,+2) 
Mean 3.83 -52.31 -4.2 Change -56.14 -8.03 
Median 2.52 2.44 2.47 p value 0.347 0.082* 
    Wilcoxon p 
value 
0.54 0.357 
The table reports the operating performance of the combined entities.  *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 19: Changes in the operating performance of RTOs versus changes in the operating performance of 
matched IPOs. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Period (0,+1) 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
RTOs) 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
matched IPOs) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 16.99 
(1.99) 
-3.61 
(0.12) 
0.002*** 
(0.005)*** 
ROE 17.95 
(2.75) 
-4.94 
(-2.79) 
0.021** 
(0.001)*** 
Cash/total assets -3.2 
(-1.23) 
-6.10 
(-1.98) 
0.07* 
(0.117) 
Current ratio -0.41 
(-0.04) 
-1.45 
(-0.19) 
0.01** 
(0.005)*** 
Quick ratio -0.43 
(-0.04) 
-1.38 
(-0.14) 
0.016** 
(0.026)** 
Cash ratio -0.43 
(-0.03) 
-1.34 
(-0.1) 
0.017** 
(0.009)*** 
Debt/total assets 0.87 
(0) 
3.39 
(0) 
0.077* 
(0.171) 
ATO 11.66 
(5.48) 
2.41 
(1.18) 
0.038** 
(0.023)** 
Altman’s Z score -72.38 
(0.12) 
-4.62 
(-1.03) 
0.379 
(0.012)** 
Panel B: Full sample 
Period (0,+2) 
52 
 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
RTOs) 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
matched IPOs) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 18.31 
(1.21) 
-0.56 
(0.01) 
0.044** 
(0.09)* 
ROE 11.18 
(2.02) 
-10.32 
(-4.78) 
0.07* 
(0.061)* 
Cash/total assets -2.38 
(-1.16) 
-8.04 
(-3.86) 
0.004*** 
(0.009)*** 
Current ratio -0.39 
(-0.04) 
-1.39 
(-0.29) 
0.063* 
(0.004)*** 
Quick ratio -0.42 
(-0.1) 
-1.34 
(-0.23) 
0.076* 
(0.005)*** 
Cash ratio -0.42 
(-0.04) 
-1.24 
(-0.22) 
0.108 
(0.001)*** 
Debt/total assets 2.84 
(0) 
8.05 
(0) 
0.083* 
(0.374) 
ATO 25.56 
(10.7) 
8.2 
(3.8) 
0.017** 
(0.043) 
Altman’s Z score -9.3 
(-0.03) 
-8.41 
(-2.15) 
0.89 
(0.000)*** 
The table shows whether the (absolute) changes in the operating performance of RTOs are significantly different from the 
(absolute) changes in the operating performance of their matched IPOs. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
The aforementioned results remain qualitatively unchanged when we split the European RTO 
population into UK and non-UK samples, as presented in Table 20, Panels A, B, C, and D. 
This finding is in alignment with our previous inferences concerning the long-term price 
performance of RTOs and their matched IPOs. Thus, our empirical analysis so far 
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corroborates the argument that the RTO mechanism offers a viable alternative for specific 
types of firms (Appadu et al., 2014). 
Table 20: Changes in the operating performance of RTOs versus changes in the operating performance of 
matched IPOs. 
Panel A: UK sample  
Period (0,+1) 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
RTOs) 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
matched IPOs) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 26.32 
(1.7) 
-5.13 
(0.15) 
0.007*** 
(0.064)* 
ROE 11.7 
(1.99) 
-3.54 
(-2.54) 
0.164 
(0.062)* 
Cash/total assets -2.19 
(-1.55) 
-7.14 
(-2.43) 
0.029** 
(0.116) 
Current ratio 0.24 
(-0.11) 
-1.63 
(-0.21) 
0.084* 
(0.075)* 
Quick ratio 0.33 
(-0.08) 
-1.53 
(-0.16) 
0.080* 
(0.24) 
Cash ratio 0.33 
(-0.06) 
-1.58 
(-0.11) 
0.073* 
(0.12) 
Debt/total assets 2.07 
(0) 
3.99 
(0) 
0.336 
(0.5) 
ATO 4.92 
(6.08) 
1.53 
(0.99) 
0.684 
(0.011)** 
Altman’s Z score -107.26 
(-0.33) 
-5.26 
(-1.03) 
0.313 
(0.276) 
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Panel B: UK sample  
Period (0,+2) 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
RTOs) 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
matched IPOs) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 25.22 
(1.14) 
5.14 
(0.54) 
0.13 
(0.443) 
ROE 6.07 
(-0.64) 
-2.84 
(-1.3) 
0.463 
(0.727) 
Cash/total assets -0.47 
(-1.08) 
-9.24 
(-5.7) 
0.001*** 
(0.003)*** 
Current ratio 0.32 
(-0.12) 
-1.42 
(-0.28) 
0.147 
(0.049)** 
Quick ratio 0.35 
(-0.12) 
-1.36 
(-0.23) 
0.14 
(0.091)* 
Cash ratio 0.35 
(-0.08) 
-1.34 
(-0.24) 
0.145 
(0.030)** 
Debt/total assets 5.41 
(0.14) 
11.08 
(0) 
0.215 
(0.947) 
ATO 23.41 
(13.22) 
8.02 
(3.99) 
0.382 
(0.055)* 
Altman’s Z score -11.48 
(-0.32) 
-9.49 
(-2.67) 
0.808 
(0.004)*** 
Panel C: non -UK sample  
Period (0,+1) 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
p value for 
differences in means 
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RTOs) matched IPOs) (p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 12.05 
(3.01) 
-2.29 
(-0.7) 
0.049** 
(0.005)*** 
ROE 30.18 
(10.4) 
-6.82 
(-5.31) 
0.056* 
(0.001)*** 
Cash/total assets -2.85 
(-0.56) 
-3.22 
(-0.99) 
0.88 
(0.593) 
Current ratio 0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.96 
(-0.06) 
0.042** 
(0.021)** 
Quick ratio 0.1 
(0.01) 
-0.95 
(-0.1) 
0.04** 
(0.017)** 
Cash ratio 0.09 
(0.03) 
-0.67 
(-0.03) 
0.03** 
(0.014)** 
Debt/total assets -0.16 
(-0.14) 
1.77 
(0.16) 
0.612 
(0.293) 
ATO 18.93 
(1.84) 
5.02 
(3.14) 
0.157 
(0.733) 
Altman’s Z score 0.15 
(0.75) 
-1.29 
(0.01) 
0.335 
(0.085)* 
Panel D: non -UK sample  
Period (0,+2) 
 Mean changes for 
RTOs 
(Median changes for 
RTOs) 
Mean changes for 
matched IPOs 
(Median changes for 
matched IPOs) 
p value for 
differences in means 
(p value for 
differences in medians) 
ROA 4.41 
(1.65) 
-8.32 
(-3.05) 
0.14 
(0.004)*** 
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ROE 21.67 
(8.65) 
-24.94 
(-9.58) 
0.061 
(0.002)*** 
Cash/total assets -4.07 
(-1.38) 
-4.56 
(-1.26) 
0.868 
(0.991) 
Current ratio -0.23 
(0.07) 
-1.3 
(-0.29) 
0.082* 
(0.023)** 
Quick ratio -0.11 
(-0.07) 
-1.28 
(-0.3) 
0.052* 
(0.004)*** 
Cash ratio -0.13 
(-0.03) 
-0.92 
(-0.14) 
0.058* 
(0.004)*** 
Debt/total assets -0.92 
(-0.21) 
3.85 
(1.16) 
0.08* 
(0.097)* 
ATO 25.38 
(8.25) 
10.57 
(3.62) 
0.235 
(0.372) 
Altman’s Z score -2.26 
(0.18) 
-2.47 
(-0.72) 
0.96 
(0.036)** 
The table shows whether the (absolute) changes in the operating performance of RTOs are significantly different from the 
(absolute) changes in the operating performance of their matched IPOs. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
In summary, RTO firms keep facing considerable challenges in the post-going public era in 
terms of profitability, liquidity, leverage, asset use efficiency and distress. Our results are in 
line with Dasilas et al. (2017) who attribute the anemic post-going public operating 
performance of RTOs to the inherent difficulties of private firms in restructuring their public 
counterparts along with the risk that they encounter by merging with financially distressed 
shell companies. Similarly, Gleason et al. (2005) argue that the new managers of the enlarged 
entities are not “turnaround specialists”. 73  Nevertheless, we show that RM firms exhibit 
significantly lower deterioration in their post-going public accounting performance than that 
of their matched IPOs. The results are in contrast to the findings of Gleason et al. (2006), who 
                                                          
73 Examining Chinese reverse mergers in relation to a control sample of listed companies, Lee et al. 
(2003) provide evidence that CRMs do not exhibit worse financial performance than their matched 
firms. The authors argue that both RMs and their control firms reveal the risks inherent in investing in 
development-stage penny stocks that trade in the OTC markets.    
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report a significantly better financial performance for their control IPO sample relative to the 
RM sample. We conjecture that this disparity in the accounting performance between US and 
European samples can be ascribed to the fact that in Europe (and especially in the UK) the 
majority of RTO transactions involve synergistic mergers with going-concern public 
companies. More generally, Pagano et al. (1998) argue that in Europe companies seeking for 
a public status are usually more mature and consequently less risky than companies in the US. 
Survival analysis 
Table 21 presents the survival rates of RTOs versus their matched IPOs over 6, 12, 18 and 24 
months after the going-public event.74 The results show that the survival rates of RTO firms 
are high and almost identical to that of IPO firms. By the end of the 24-month period under 
examination, the survival rates of RTOs are 97.01% while those of IPOs are 97.5% (full 
sample). According to Panels B and C, both RTOs and IPOs exhibit equivalent survival rates 
even when we split the overall population into UK and non-UK sub-samples.   
Table 21: Survival rates of RTOs and their matched IPOs. 
Panel A: Full sample   
 RTOs IPOs 
6-month survival rate (in %) 100 100 
12-month survival rate (in %) 99.5 99 
18-month survival rate (in %) 99 99 
24-month survival rate (in %) 97.01 97.5 
 
Panel B: UK sample   
 RTOs IPOs 
6-month survival rate (in %) 100 100 
12-month survival rate (in %) 100 99.34 
18-month survival rate (in %) 99.34 99.34 
24-month survival rate (in %) 97.35 98.01 
 
Panel C: non-UK sample   
 RTOs IPOs 
6-month survival rate (in %) 100 100 
12-month survival rate (in %) 98 98 
18-month survival rate (in %) 98 98 
                                                          
74 Due to data unavailability we report the survival rates of the final RTO and matched IPO samples.    
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24-month survival rate (in %) 96 96 
This table reports the survival rates of RTOs and their matched IPOs (as % of the full sample and the UK and non-UK 
sub-samples respectively). Each company is considered alive, if it has not been delisted or acquired by a third entity 
during the two years after the going-public event. 
Our findings are in accordance with Appadu et al. (2014), who show that the 2-year survival 
rates of UK RTOs and their IPO peers are 90% and 95% respectively. Similarly, Floros and 
Sastri (2010) find that the survival rates of their US RTO sample are 90.20%.  Moreover, Lee 
et al. (2013) display that over two years after the flotation the survival rates of RMs and a 
control sample of firms listed in the US stock markets are 98% and 91% respectively.75 
Overall, the results of our survival analysis are in line with the aforementioned long-term 
price performance and operating performance of RTOs versus their matched IPOs.    
SECTION 7 
Conclusion    
During the last two decades many companies have entered the capital markets via reverse 
takeovers, instead of the traditional IPOs. Nevertheless, recent cases of fraudulent activities 
around RM deals have challenged the credibility of such transactions. As a response, 
regulators all over the world intervened in the RTO markets in an attempt to enhance 
transparency and investor protection. 
Employing a sample of 224 RTOs and a matched sample of IPOs that listed on the European 
stock exchanges between 1996 and 2015, we provide evidence concerning alternative going-
public mechanisms from a market, the European one, which is virtually under researched. 
First, we find statistically significant CARs surrounding the RTOs’ announcement dates 
implying that these transactions have value effects for the shareholders of the public firms. In 
fact, the sample of RTO firms exhibits a 3-day announcement CAR of 7.1%. We then report 
first-day returns of the new combined entities vis-à-vis the first-day returns of their control 
IPO counterparts. We show that the latter experience significantly higher first day returns 
than the former, since a portion of RTOs’ underpricing is captured in the initial returns to the 
public vehicle around the merger announcement dates. Second, we analyze the long-term 
                                                          
75 The evidence from the US markets is conflicting. For instance, Gleason et al. (2005) find that only 
46% of the RTOs under examination survive after two years. Adjei et al. (2007) report the 3-year 
survival rates of their RTO sample in the vicinity of 60%. We conjecture that this disparity is due to the 
different database that is used in each paper: Gleason et al. (2005) and Adjei et al. (2007) use the SDC 
database, which mainly contains RMs with regularly operating public companies. Floros & Sastri 
(2010) and Lee et al. (2013) also use the DFM database, which mostly consists of RMs with public shell 
companies.     
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price performance of RTOs and their control IPO firms by calculating BHARs for the periods 
6, 12, 18 and 24 months after the going public event. At the end of the second year, RTOs 
display comparable losses (-21.48%) to that of their matched IPOs (-19.8%) and the 
difference is not statistically significant. The differences in BHARs between the two groups 
are not statistically significant even when we split the overall RTO and IPO population into 
UK and non-UK sub-samples.  
Third, we focus on the post-going public operating performance of the two alternative listing 
methods by computing various financial ratios for the year of the event and the subsequent 
two years. We show that RTO firms incur in the long term significantly lower deterioration in 
their liquidity, financial leverage and likelihood of bankruptcy compared to that of the 
matched IPOs. The former also exhibit significantly better improvement than the latter in 
terms of profitability and asset use efficiency. These outcomes remain qualitatively 
unchanged when we examine UK and non-UK sub-samples separately. Last but not least, we 
report the survival rates of RTOs and their matched IPOs by examining whether each 
company of the two samples survived or not (as a result of delisting or acquisition by another 
company) over two years after the going-public event. We show that both RTOs and IPOs 
exhibit high and almost identical survival rates, in line with our previous analysis. These 
findings remain again unaltered when we study UK and non-UK companies separately. 
Overall, we conclude that within Europe reverse takeovers should offer a viable alternative to 
IPOs for certain types of firms; more importantly, this inference is not UK-driven but rather a 
wider phenomenon.76  
We trust that our results have managerial implications for managers, investors and policy 
makers. Particularly, managers of private firms can also consider the RTO option before they 
decide which going-public mechanism is tailored to their company’s needs. Furthermore, 
investors could potentially include in their portfolios public shell companies which are about 
to merge with a private company. Moreover, policy makers could reassess their recent 
regulatory initiatives in the IPO markets by giving credit to the efficiency of RTO 
transactions.  
Finally, our study could be further expanded by researchers who are interested in the ways of 
raising capital. For instance, a comparison of stock price and accounting performance of 
RTOs with a control sample of firms that used the “emerging growth company” (EGC) status 
                                                          
76 Greene (2016) shows that when RMs are closely matched with IPOs, the wealth of private firm 
owners who “exit” their firm through the RM method is not significantly different from the wealth 
that could be gained via an IPO. The author contends that the RM mechanism itself is not detrimental 
to the wealth of private firm owners. We support this argument.    
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under JOBS Act would offer a clear view regarding the effectiveness of the new regulations 
applied to IPOs. Similarly, a comparative analysis between European RTOs and an up-to date 
sample of firms that listed on the ENTERNEXT would provide evidence from Europe.   
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